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The phrase "a horse of a different color ... probably derives from a phrase coined by
Shakespeare, who wrote 'a horse of that color' (Twelfth Night, 2:3), meaning 'the same matter'
rather than a different one. By the mid-1800s the term was used to point out difference rather
than likeness." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF IDIOMs 311 (1997). The idiom was
popularized in THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939):
Dorothy: Oh, please! Please, sir! I've got to see the Wizard! The Good Witch
of the North sent me!
Guardian of the Emerald City Gates: Prove it!
Scarecrow: She's wearing the ruby slippers she gave her.
Guardian of the Emerald City Gates: Oh. so she is! Well, bust my buttons!
Why didn't you say that in the first place? That's a horse of a different color!
Come on in!
401
1
Delligatti: A Horse of a Different Color: Distinguishing the Judiciary from t
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
B. Does Arizona Free Enterprise Club Overrule North Carolina
Right To Life? .............................. 443
VI. SOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MODERN CAMPAIGN FINANCE
JURISPRUDENCE AND HISTORICAL NOTIONS OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE ............................................... 444
VII. CONCLUSION ................................. ....... 447
APPENDIX ............................................... 449
While in politics lack of actual impropriety is an absolute
defense to everything but the raging of the press, in the
judiciary the appearance of impropriety is as reprehensible as
the real thing.
- Justice Richard Neely2
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2011, in Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett
("Arizona Free Enterprise Club"), the United States Supreme Court held
unconstitutional an Arizona voluntary public financing law for legislative and
executive elections because of a matching funds provision.3 Under the Arizona
matching funds provision, a publicly funded candidate would receive increased
amounts of funds based on expenditures made by privately funded candidates
or independent organizations. This holding, along with much of the modem
campaign finance jurisprudence, should not be extended to judicial elections
because the judiciary is distinguishable from the other two governmental
branches, both in terms of the state interests at play and the regulation of
speech in pursuing those interests.' In a tripartite government, the state's
interest in an independent judiciary should be considered greater than the
state's interest in an independent legislative or executive branch (collectively
referred to as the "political branches").6
Campaign speech in legislative and executive elections promotes
democracy in the marketplace of ideas; however, such speech in judicial
elections is often a threat to the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
2 RICHARD NEELY, How CouRTs GOVERN AMERICA 194 (1981).
Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
4 Id. The matching funds provision under the Arizona law also called for matching funds for
contributions.
See infra Part II.
6 The political branches are made up of elected representatives fighting on behalf of their
constituencies. The judiciary is composed of judges who interpret and apply the law. Politicians
are also known as representatives. A healthy democracy requires politicians to represent their
constituents. There is no such thing as a judicial representative. See infra Part II.
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Historically, the judiciary has been treated differently in terms of the
enforcement of its independence. Not only have the methods for enforcing
judicial independence been different from those applied to the political
branches, so too have the selection methods used. At the birth of the United7
States, all state judges were appointed by either the legislature or the governor.
States adopted elections for judges during the nineteenth century due to rising
concerns that the judiciary had become too political and dependent on the
legislative branch.8 The same rationales for switching to judicial elections in
the nineteenth century and the desire for an independent judiciary are being
touted in the twenty-first century as a rationale to revert back to judicial
appointments. 9
This history of distinguishing the judiciary by showing a need for
greater protection of its independence conflicts with the Roberts Court's recent
line of cases striking down campaign finance laws. The Arizona Free
Enterprise Club Court held that the matching funds provision enacted in
Arizona violated the First Amendment free speech rights of privately financed
candidates by substantially burdening political speech.10 In 2010, the West
Virginia Legislature adopted a similar program, albeit solely for judicial
elections, by enacting a voluntary public financing law known as the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Public Campaign Financing Pilot Program
("Pilot Program")" for West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals elections.
Under the Pilot Program, a candidate who qualifies for public financing
receives public funding based on what opponents and/or independent persons
spend in opposition to the publicly funded candidate.' 2 It should be noted that
West Virginia Supreme Court struck down the matching funds provision after
completion of this Note.' 3
7 CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 4 (2009);
Matthew J. Streb, Judicial Elections and Public Perceptions of the Courts, in THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 147, 150 (Bruce Peabody ed.. 2011).
Streb, supra note 7, at 150.
9 See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-89 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (arguing that judicial elections themselves are a threat to judicial independence).
10 Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
I W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-1 (LexisNexis 2011).
12 See infra Part V.
* State ex rel. Loughry v. Tennant, No. 12-0899, 2012 WL 3892747 (W. Va. Sept. 7, 2012).
The West Virginia Supreme Court struck the matching funds portion of the pilot program holding
that judicial campaign speech is political speech, that strict scrutiny applies, that the matching
funds provision does not further a compelling state interest, and that if it did further a compelling
state interest it was not narrowly tailored to it. Id. The court stated:
Having determined that the Suoreme Court did not recognize a iudicial-
election exception to its matching funds analysis in Bennett. and considering
the similarities between Arizona's matching funds provisions and those set
forth in our Pilot Program, W.Va. Code § 3-12-11(e)-(i), we conclude that
4032012]
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The West Virginia legislature passed the Pilot Program in response to
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Caperton v. A. T Massey Coal Co.,
Inc.,14 which held that due process required West Virginia Supreme Court
Justice Brent Benjamin to recuse himself from a $50 million case pending
before the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, when the company's
chairman and CEO spent $3 million on the 2004 supreme court election which
successfully secured Benjamin a seat on the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals.' 5 The Court stated that "[j]ust as no man is allowed to be a judge in
his own cause, similar fears of bias can arise when-without the other parties'
consent-a man chooses the judge in his own cause."' 6
The West Virginia legislature modeled the Pilot Program after North
Carolina's voluntary public financing law for judicial elections,' 7  the
constitutionality of which was upheld by the Fourth Circuit. 8 The Court in
Arizona Free Enterprise Club did not mention or address the Fourth Circuit's
decision regarding the North Carolina public financing proram and failed to
distinguish between the judiciary and the political branches.1
Just as judicial elections have been distinguished from legislative and
executive elections by the Supreme Court regarding equal protection analysis,20
judicial elections should be viewed in a broader context in the realm of free
the Pilot Program's matching funds provisions place a substantial burden on
the privately financed candidates' First Amendment free speech rights.
Id. The Loughry court's logic is that because the United States Supreme Court did not carve out
an exception for judicial campaign speech in the Arizona law that did not apply to judicial
elections makes the law unconstitutional for judicial elections. Id. Such logic presumes that when
deciding cases or controversies, the Supreme Court should contrive possible exceptions to its
analysis. In doing this the court sidestepped any analysis as to whether the judiciary should be
scrutinized differently.
14 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
15 Id. at 890.
16 Id. at 870.
17 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.61 (2012).
18 N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427,
432 (4th Cir. 2008). There are currently two states offering public financing for elections to state
courts of last resort: New Mexico and West Virginia. New Mexico's Voter Action Act, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 1-19A-1 (LexisNexis 2012); West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Public
Campaign Financing Pilot Program, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-1 (LexisNexis 2011); H.B. 4130,
79th Leg., 2d Sess. (W. Va. 2010). Wisconsin did have a public financing system for judicial
elections but repealed the statute in 2011. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 11.50-11.522 (West 2012)
repealed by 2011 Act 32, §§ 13vb-16e (July 1, 2011). North Carolina had a public financing
system for judicial elections. North Carolina Public Campaign Fund, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-
278.61 (2012) (enacted in 2002 and struck down in 2012 on a motion for summary judgment
when the state chose not to defend the law in N.C. Right to Life Pol. Action Comm. v. Leake,
No. 5:11 -CV-472-FL, 2012 WL 1825829 (E.D.N.C. May 18, 2012)).
19 Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
20 See Wells v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095, 1095 (1973).
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speech analysis. The Pilot Program should be upheld for two reasons: first,
strict scrutiny should not apply to freedom of speech issues in judicial
elections, and second, the law passes strict scrutiny analysis due to the fact that
it is narrowly tailored to restore the appearance of independence in the West
Virginia judiciary. A relaxed standard of scrutiny should apply, giving
legislatures greater discretion when attempting to balance free speech and
judicial independence in crafting judicial selection methods.2 1
Judicial selection methods should be evaluated based upon the
selection method's effects on two factors: speech and corruption/independence.
Such a two-pronged framework gives states greater discretion in choosing
judicial selection methods. Greater discretion in crafting judicial selection
methods, compared to legislative and executive selection methods, is essential
because the issue of judicial independence is, and historically has been, more
important than legislative or executive independence, and such judicial
independence must be weighed against any free speech issues stemming from
laws regulating elections.
Part II lays out the history of distinguishing the judiciary from the
political branches. Next, Part III explains modem campaign finance
jurisprudence. Part IV outlines Caperton v. Massey22 and demonstrates that
modem campaign finance jurisprudence is in conflict with the long history of
distinguishing the judicial branch from the political branches. Part IV also
shows that there is an appearance of impropriety surrounding the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals and demonstrates that recent judicial elections are a
cause of the public's perception of impropriety. Part V analyzes the Pilot
Program and argues that Arizona Free Enterprise Club does not invalidate the
Pilot Program's matching funds provision. Part VI provides a framework for
evaluating policies to address the appearance of impropriety. Finally, Part VII
concludes that because the judiciary is a distinct branch of government, judicial
elections should not be subject to a strict scrutiny analysis under the First
Amendment. Instead First Amendment issues in judicial elections should be
subject to a balancing test. This way, West Virginia's Pilot Program can
maintain the integrity, impartiality, and independence that originally gave rise,
reason, and repute to the judiciary.
21 For an argument that the balance of impartial courts and free speech is in danger, see Bert
Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland, Justice in Peril: The Endangered Balance Between Impartial
Courts and Judicial Election Campaigns, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1229 (2008).
22 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
2012] 405
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II. A HORSE OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: DISTINGUISHING THE JUDICIARY
The judiciary has a long history of being viewed through a different
lens than other operations of government.23 For instance, bribery began as a
common law offense that only applied to judges and acts of a judicial nature.24
In 1628, Sir Edward Coke wrote a definition of bribery:
Bribery is a great misprision (1), when any man in judiciall
place (2) takes any fee or pension, robe, or livery, gift, reward
(3) or brocage (4) of any person, that hath to do before him any
way (5), for doing his office, or by colour of his office, but of
the king only, unlesse it be of meat and drink, and that of small
value, upon divers, and grievous punishments.25
The definition of bribery has since been extended to all branches of
government. Nonetheless, bribery laws are the last and weakest means of
addressing corruption and only rarely stop corruption because the stringent
requirements of the law require that five elements be proved: that a 1) public
official 2) receives something of value 3) from someone with a corrupt intent 4)
23 Former West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Richard Neely argued that it is the
"contemplative nature" of the judiciary that distinguishes judges from other less temperate
governmental officials. NEELY, supra note 2, at 146. Neely argued that "if Earl Warren had been
made a deputy sheriff in McDowell County, West Virginia, within six months he would have
been beating up suspects in the back of police cars. Id. It is not the quality of men which makes
temperate judges, but the contemplative nature of the institution." Id. Neely went on to further
distinguish the judiciary from the other branches:
In elected politics, the legislature and executive take idealistic, energetic,
ambitious young men and turn them into whores in five years; the judiciary
takes good, old, tired experienced whores and turns them into virgins in five
years. The men are not the source of either transformation-they are of the
same type, particularly since judges are either graduates or rejects of politics.
The decisive factor is the institution-whether the exact same creatures are
quartered in the local house of ill fame or in the Temple of Vestal
Virgins....
Since it has been implicitly recognized that officials will be either whores or
virgins in response to their surroundings, the emphasis on the judiciary has
not been the selection of the personnel but rather on the molding of the
institution....
For those who did not find my comparison to virgins compelling, there is
another simile: judges bear a striking resemblance to eunuchs; their
emasculation entitles them to free access to life's temptations. The
emasculation is the product of both historical accident and conscious molding
of the institution....
Id. at 190-91.
24 See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 43 (1979), for a discussion on the history of
bribery.
25 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 144 (W.
Clarke & Sons, 1809) (1628).
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to influence 5) an official act.26 Furthermore, bribery laws are especially
poorly suited for controlling the appearance of impropriety in judicial elections
because the appearance of corruption begins during the election process.
The distinction between the judiciary and the political branches
continued through the formation of the United States. The Federalist Papers
stressed the importance of an independent judiciary and called for the
appointment of judges rather than elections, which the Federalist Papers
maintained were important for the political branches. In Federalist No. 78,
Alexander Hamilton wrote:
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the
bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative
encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong
argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since
nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent
spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful
performance of so arduous a duty.
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard
the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects
of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the
influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate
among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily
give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection,
have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the
minor party in the community....
[I]t is easy to see, that it would require an uncommon portion
of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians
of the Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been
instigated by the major voice of the community.
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only,
that the independence of the judges may be an essential
safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the
27society.
26 DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 640 (Carolina
Acad. Press, 4th ed. 2008) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006)).
27 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 453-54 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass'n ed., 2009). The
Antifederalists agreed with the Federalists on this issue arguing that:
rThe Constitution] made the iudees indecendent. in the fullest sense of the
word. There is no Dower above them, to control any of their decisions. There
is no authority that can remove them, and they cannot be controlled by the
laws of the legislature. In short, they are independent of the people, of the
2012] 407
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The Constitution then explicitly distinguished the judiciary from the
political branches by setting up a congress and president that are both elected to
terms while setting up a judiciary that is appointed for life terms. The
Constitution also implicitly distinguishes judicial selection at the state level by
requiring that states have a "Republican Form of Government," knowing that
states were appointing their judiciaries.
The attitude of treating the political branches differently from the
judicial branches extended to the formation of the state of West Virginia.
During the Debates and Proceedings of the First Constitutional Convention of
West Virginia, representatives from the northwestern counties of Virginia had a
lively debate on the topic. 28 Mr. Battelle of Ohio County laid out the struggle
between judges being accountable to the public and judges being independent
of the public:
[W]ith the responsibilities, as I understand it of a merely
representative officer and of a judicial officer to the people are
very distinct and different. Or rather they are responsible in
different ways. A merely representative officer . .. is
responsible only to the laws of the land; but according to our
theory of government he is responsible, and wisely so, to the
will of his constituents .... Now, sir, according to our theory
of government ... a judicial officer is responsible also to the
people but in a different way. He is responsible in the eye of
your written law, whether his term of office be long or short,
his responsibility should be clear, distinct, and emphatic ....
[H]e is responsible - wisely so - for the proper discharge of the
duties of his office, not to the caprice, prejudice or whims of
people, but he is responsible to the written law as you
le2islature, and of every power under heaven. Men placed in this situation
will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself.
THE ANTIFEDERALIST No. 78, at 223 ("Brutus" (likely Robert Yates)) (Morton Borden ed., 1965).
28 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 756-892
(Charles H. Ambler et al. eds., 1939) [hereinafter DEBATES 2]. This debate took place on January
22-24, 1862 in Wheeling, Virginia. The conventioneer who moved for a discussion on "the
number and character of the courts" was Waitman T. Willey, a lawyer from Monongalia County.
Id. at 756. At the time, Willey represented the Restored Government of Virginia in the United
States Senate and then went on to represent West Virginia in the United States Senate.
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
http:/Ibioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W000484 (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
Senator Willey was the father of William P. Willey who was a professor at the West Virginia
University College of Law and founded the WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW in 1894, known then as
THE BAR. B. M. Ambler, William P. Willey-An Appreciation, 25 W. VA. L. Q. 1, 1-3 (1917).
Professor Willey was the editor of THE BAR from 1894 until 1917. Id. at 2. Of the sixty-one
conventioneers present, only sixteen were lawyers while nineteen where farmers. 1 DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 59-60 (Charles H. Ambler et al. eds.,
1939).
408 [Vol. 115
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yourselves have put it down and nominated in the bond. Now,
sir, a judge, in obedience to the dictate of his high office, may
sometimes feel himself, in vindication of the principle of
justice in the person of one citizen of your county, compelled
to violate the wishes and prejudices and the caprice of every
other man in the county. If he does so unjustly, let it be written
in your law that he shall be subject to impeachment and
removal from office. But if a judge be compelled, while
vindicating the law in the person perhaps one of humblest
citizens of the community though he may run counter to the
feelings and desires of every other in the community, we ought
to put it into our law that by frequent returns to popular
elections that man may not be tempted to swerve from the
requirements of his duty though those requirements lead him in
the face of a large majority of his constituents.29
Mr. Stevenson of Wood County disagreed with Mr. Battelle:
The whole argument is based on the supposition that the
position of judge is something very different from all other
positions in society, that it must be regulated upon an entirely
different principle. That is not more true than it is of any other
office. There is a difference between a legislative office and an
executive office. In fact, there is a difference in almost all the
30
offices to some extent ....
Conventioneers put forth many policy proposals on judicial selection
methods and terms of office. At the heart of the debate was the question: from
what or who should judges be independent?
A. Independent from Whom? 31
AM. VAN WINKLE. Before the gentleman sits down, I should like
to ask him one question.
MR. SMITH. Yes, sir?
29 DEBATES 2, supra note 28, at 791-92.
30 Id. at 792.
31 Lewis Kornhauser argues that judicial independence is not a useful concept because the
confusion over the term's meaning cannot be overcome. Lewis A. Komhauser, Is Judicial
Independence a Useful Concept?, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 45 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002). Cf
Charles M. Cameron, Judicial Independence: How Can You Tell It When You See It? And, Who
Cares?, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 135
(Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) (arguing that judicial independence is
synonymous with judicial autonomy and can be observed easily and measured precisely).
2012] 409
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MR. VAN WINKLE. Who are these judges to be independent of?
MR. SMITH. They are to be independent of everybody but their
own duty.
MR. VAN WINKLE. I suppose the gentleman remembers in
England, where the crown could not say, go down there, but
could say come up here.32
Both the founders of the United States in Philadelphia in 1776, as well
as the founders of West Virginia in Wheeling in the early 1860s, harbored
concerns about judicial independence. These concerns beg the question,
"independent from whom?" Are judges to be independent of the legislature, the
executive, litigants, attorneys, the public, or some combination thereof? Most
would agree on the most basic level that judges should be independent of the
litigants and the lawyers appearing in their court.
On January 23, 1862, at the first constitutional convention of West
Virginia, Mr. Van Winkle of Wood County and Mr. Smith of Logan County
held differing opinions regarding from whom judges shall be independent.
Mr. Van Winkle thought that judges should be independent of the political
branches (favoring elections), while Mr. Smith thought that judges should be
independent of the public at large, or, more specifically, those appearing in the
judge's court (favoring appointments).34 Mr. Smith was also concerned about
32 Debates 2, supra note 28, at 807-08.
33 Id. at 797-803. Peter G. Van Winkle went on to become a United States Senator
representing West Virginia.
34 Mr. Van Winkle:
[T]he "independence of the judiciary and bar" . . . is one of the principles of
constitutional liberty of our forefathers in the mother country. It was adopted
there because the courts stood between the crown and the people. The judges
being appointed by the crown, and being-as has been admitted, I believe in
all generations, that notwithstanding they were made life-estates and so
removed from the fear of the crown. I do think one of the most contemptible
curs in history is Sir Edward Cooke[sic]-the father of all the lawyers
(Laughter). A more servile scoundrel never stepped, perhaps on the face of
this earth.
Id. at 797-98.
Mr. Smith responded:
We have no monarchy before whom to bow but the monarchy of law, and
that law is administered by the iudiciary. That monarchy oueht to be oure and
learned, he ought to be. but for the preiudices of the country. lifted up to
independence. I know it is a position that will rather startle the public mind
for I say it is the interest of the poor and humble that he should be so. The
preat and powerful need no protection: their influence in the country-their
wealth buys them protection, secures it to them: but to the weak and humble
it is far otherwise. They are the subiects of oooression. but 2ive power and
independence to the iudiciary and there is their shield, their orotection. I go
for the independence of the iudiciary. I am in favor of it as an orieinal
principle, not on account of the rich and wealthy but on account of the poor
410 [Vol. 115
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the integrity of a man who would "prostitute himself'35 for office and "give out
liquor for votes." 36 Another factor concerning the participants at the
and humble who may ask protection from it and ask it in safety. Our
distinguished Chief Justice Marshall in the later period of his life when in the
Convention of Virginia in 1829-30 makes the remark that "of all the ills that
heaven can inflict on a weak community. the worst is a too decendent
Judiciary." I concur in the sentiment. There is a iudge to be elected: he comes
in for office: he has served one term and he seeks re-election. Every man
who is his elector may be sued in court: and however iust and righteous he
may be. he will be swerved more or less by interest. It will control the best:
and when a man who has a hundred votes at his beck and a poor humble
dependent that can hardly control his own vote come in collision in his court.
how does the poor and humble man stand? Here the iudge says I decide in
favor of the humble man and lose a hundred votes. I decide against him. I
gain a hundred. Now I ask you. considering the frailty of human nature, its
inability to stand against temptation whether iustice is secure under such a
contrariety of interest on the part of the iudge? To make him independent, to
place before him no temptation but the desire to do right and to be uoright
and honorable with a high reputation in his position, where the humble can
stand on the same pedestal as the rich-the man with his two hundred or
three hundred and the man with his million-so there shall be no difference
between them. He stands his equal in every respect before the judge ....
Id. at 803.
3 Mr. Smith told a story about a man he knows:
Sir, I undertake to say that the iudiciary of Virginia has declined in learning
and wisdom and ourity. I have had some experience of it in my own country:
I know how it ooerates there. There is a man now who is fleeing to the South
in pursuit of his "rights" who has been elected to that office but is unworthy
to untie the latches on the shoes of a competent man. He has neither learning
nor integrity: Yet he takes the stump for four months: he prods about his
neighbors' log cabins. kissing every dirty child he meets to secure this office.
I maintain that he who will prostitute himself to secure an office by
electioneering for a iudicial office is unworthy of the position. He should not
have my vote. But it is done. I recollect in the convention I said I did not
believe that any man who aspired to this office would dare to take the stump
to electioneer for it; but now. sir. at the cross roads every sort of maneuver
and trick is resorted to by those who asoire to that part of the iudiciary. I am
disgusted: I claim to have no interest in this matter: but I have a love for my
country, and I desire to do that which will oromote its great interests. I am
here defending the rights of the poor and the humble. I will not undertake to
defend the rights of the rich.
Id. at 804.
I am an old man and have had much experience in the iudiciary. and I oray
you, in the name of Heaven, if you do make a iudiciary. make it
indeendent-as independent as you can. Forget all these narrow little
oreiudices that grow up in the public mind and come up magnanimously to
the issue: to the auestion of the interests of those who are involved, and do
your duty fearless of consequences ....
Id. at 806.
36 Mr. Smith said:
I claim to be the advocate of the humble. the honest. the industrious laboring
community. not those who are running from precinct and from township to
township, going to cross-roads, giving out liouor and leaving money to
electioneer with. I go against all that. I go for a judiciary that are in a
condition not of temptation but to do justice to all.
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convention, which is also related to judicial independence, was term limits.
There were concerns about creating a "life estate"37 in office if judges were
selected for life, but there were also concerns about the effect that short terms
would have on judges seeking reelection. Elections may cause judges to rule
with the upcoming election in mind. West Virginia Supreme Court Justice
Richard Neely wrote:
Most of my day is consumed by working as the inside man at
the judicial skunkworks where I slog through tedious criminal,
workers' compensation, and product liability cases. If I say to
myself, "the hell with those Frenchmen at Michelin!" and give
some injured West Virginian a few hundred thousand dollars, it
doesn't shatter the foundations of West Virginia's commercial
world. Since I'm paid to choose between deciding for Michelin
and sleeping well, I choose sleeping well. Why hurt my
friends when there is no percentage in it?38
Justices may make decisions to foster an upcoming election, 39 an
upcoming reappointment, or even as payback for the appointment-Bush v.
Gore is one such example. 4 0 Politics are always present in any decision-making
body, especially one that is sometimes charged with formulating policy. West
Id. at 807. West Virginia has a storied history of buying votes with liquor. See generally ALLEN
H. LOUGHRY, DON'T BuY ANOTHER VOTE, I WON'T PAY FOR A LANDSLIDE: THE SORDID AND
CONTINUING POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN WEST VIRGINIA 178 (2006).
3 Mr. Haymond of Marion County said, "I am opposed to anything like a life estate in this
government." DEBATES 2, supra note 28, at 787. Similarly, Mr. Hervey of Brooke County said,
"[O]ur policy is not to invest men with life estates in office. We have been pursuing a different
policy heretofore." Id. at 790.
3 RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: How BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED FROM
STATE COURT POLITICS 6-7 (1988). Justice Neely was making the point that national reform was
needed in product liability cases otherwise justices would rule for in state plaintiffs because it
was in their best interest. Id. There is also social pressure exerted on attorneys and litigants to
give money to judicial campaigns. Keith Swisher argues that because campaign support may
influence judicial decisions, trial attorneys fall into a "prisoner's dilemma" whereby attorneys
must support the judge to gain favor or risk that the other side supported the judge. Even though
both sides would be better off if neither spent money on the judge's campaign, it is each party's
best option irrespective of what the opposing counsel does to give money to the judge. Keith
Swisher, Legal Ethics and Campaign Contributions: The Professional Responsibility to Pay for
Justice, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 225, 251-54 (2011).
3 For a discussion of judges deciding cases due to their reelection potential, see Steven P.
Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule ofLaw, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
689 (1995).
40 A debt of gratitude can arise from those who appointed judges to their position. For
instance, Bush v. Gore is often cited as an example. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
See generally Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110
YALE L.J. 1407 (2001).
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Virginia Supreme Court Justice Larry V. Starcher, arguing for partisan judicial
elections, noted:
[T]he issue is not whether there will be politics in the judicial
selection process, for the selection of judges always has been
and always will be political. The issue is: what sort of politics?
The politics of the few - or the politics of the many?41
In Justice Starcher's view, there is a greater threat of being beholden to the
executive and legislative branches of government than to the public. The
struggle to determine who justices should be independent from and how to
secure that independence has been going on for a very long time. Over the
course of and in response to the debate, several different methods of selecting
judges have developed. The cursory explanation of such methods is provided
next.
B. A BrieffHistory ofJudicial Selection to State Courts ofLast Resort
Judicial selection methods have varied over the years. Presently, the
vast majority of state trial court judges are elected.4 2 Selection methods to state
courts of last resort have gone through stages based upon the politics of the
times. With the exception of partisan elections, most of the selection methods
used by states would violate either the First Amendment or the Guarantee
Clause if used for the selection governors or legislators." Figures 1 and 2 show
the history of judicial selection to state courts of last resort. Figure 1 separates
selection methods into four categories-partisan elections, non-partisan
elections, merit selection, and appointment-and displayed the number of
states using each selection method from 1776-2000. Figure 2 separates out
lifetime appointments from term appointments to show that lifetime
appointments are now markedly rare.
41 Larry V. Starcher, Choosing West Virginia's Judges, W. VA. LAW., Oct. 1998, at 19.
42 For a comprehensive summary of the judicial selection process used by each state, see
Methods of Judicial Selection, AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, http://www.
judicialselection.us/judicialselection/methods/selection ofjudges.cfm?state= (last visited Sept.
16, 2012).
43 Courts of last resort are the highest courts in a state and are often called state supreme
courts. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 1579 (9th ed. 2009).
4 Courts have held that for many legislative and executive offices it is in violation of
candidates' associational rights under the First Amendment to require non-partisan elections. See
generally Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L.
REv. 28, 31-33 (2004). Furthermore the appointment schemes and merit selection would likely
be in violation of the Guarantee Clause that guarantees states will have a Republican Form of
Government if such schemes were applied to the political branches. Similarly, such non-elective
schemes may violate due-process and equal protection if applied to the political branches.
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Lee Epstein and her colleagues break the history of selection methods
to state courts of last resort into four time periods or "chapters." 4 5 First, the
revolutionary period was dominated by appointed judiciaries, most of which
had lifetime appointments. 46 Second, Jacksonian democracy brought with it
partisan elections that dominated judicial selection.47 Third, as a response to
machine politics, reformers transitioned to non-partisan elections.48 Fourth,
"legal progressives" brought an onslaught of merit selection plans (appointment
with retention election).4 9 The primary arguments in support of various
methods of judicial selection in each of these time periods have been (1) public
accountability, (2) free speech, and (3) judicial independence. These
enumerated considerations have created friction in rules governing judges and
judicial elections. The various selection methods as well as arguments for and
against them are more thoroughly analyzed in Part VI.
C. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, and Judges as (Non)Representatives
Just as selection methods for judicial office have been historically
distinguished from the political branches, so too has the regulation of judicial
speech. Regulation of judicial speech and judicial campaign speech regulation
in almost all states has its roots in the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics, which
was written by the American Bar Association5o and adopted by West Virginia
45 Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shetsova, Selecting Selection System, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH, supra note 31, at 196.
46 Id. at 196.
47 Id. at 197.
48 Id. at 198.
49 Id at 199.
50 MODEL CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/1924 canons.authcheckdam.pdf. The American Bar
Association's original canons sought to limit the conduct ofjudicial candidates in Canon 30:
A candidate for judicial position should not make or suffer others to make for
him, promises of conduct in office which appeal to the cupidity or prejudices
of the appointing or electing power; he should not announce in advance his
conclusions of law on disputed issues to secure class support, and he should
do nothing while a candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he will
administer his office with bias, partiality or improper discrimination.
While holding judicial office he should decline nomination to any other place
which might reasonably tend to create a suspicion or criticism that the proper
performance of his judicial duties is prejudiced or prevented thereby.
If a judge becomes a candidate for any office, he should refrain from all
conduct which might tend to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is using the
power or prestige of his judicial position to promote his candidacy or the
success of his party.
He should not permit others to do anything in behalf of his candidacy which
would reasonably lead to such suspicion.
[Vol. 1 15414
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on November 21, 1924.s1 The West Virginia canons cite "ancient precedents"
including Francis Bacon's Of Judicature from the early 1600s, which professes
against "parasiticurice" (parasites of the court) who "puff[] a court up beyond
her bounds, for their own scraps and advantage."' Ironically, Bacon was
removed from the office of Lord Chancellor of England in 1621 for accepting
bribes from litigants, maintaining as his defense the fact that he was bribed by
both sides.53 The modem 2010 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct is
composed of four canons, each with a number of rules. The four canons are:
Canon 1:
A judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity,
and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety.
Canon 2:
A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially,
competently, and diligently.
Canon 3:
Id.
51 CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, 98 W. Va. xxxiv (1925).
52 FRANCIS BACON, OfJudicature, in ESSAYS, CIVIL AND MORAL AND THE NEw ATLANTIS 133
(Charles W. Eliot ed., 1980) (1625).
The place of justice is an hallowed place; and therefore not only the bench,
but the foot-pace and precincts and purprise thereof, ought to be preserved
without scandal and corruption. For certainly grapes (as the Scripture saith)
will not be gathered of thorns or thistles; neither can justice yield her fruit
with sweetness amongst the briars and brambles of catching and polling
clerks and ministers. The attendance of courts is subject to four bad
instruments. First, certain persons that are sowers of suits; which make the
court swell, and the country pine. The second sort is of those that engage
courts in quarrels of jurisdiction, and are not truly amici curia, but parasiti
curiw [not friends but parasites of the court], in puffing a court up beyond
her bounds, for their own scraps and advantage. The third sort is of those that
may be accounted the left hands of courts; persons that are full of nimble and
sinister tricks and shifts, whereby they pervert the plain and direct courses of
courts, and bring justice into oblique lines and labyrinths. And the fourth is
the poller and exacter of fees; which justifies the common resemblance of the
courts of justice to the bush whereunto while the sheep flies for defence [sic]
in weather, he is sure to lose part of his fleece. On the other side, an ancient
clerk, skilful [sic] in precedents, wary in proceeding, and understanding in
the business of the court, is an excellent finger of a court; and doth many
times point the way to the judge himself.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
5 NEELY, supra note 2, at 190; Barbara Shapiro, Sir Francis Bacon and the Mid-Seventeenth
Century Movementfor Law Reform, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 331, 333 (1980).
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A judge shall conduct the judge's personal and extrajudicial
activities to minimize the risk of conflict with the obligations
of judicial office.
Canon 4:
A judge or candidate for judicial office shall not engage in
political or campaign activity that is inconsistent with the
independence, integrity, or impartiality of the judiciary.54
In the comments under the fourth canon, the ABA distinguishes
between the judiciary and the political branches:
Even when subject to public election, a judge plays a role
different from that of a legislator or executive branch official.
Rather than making decisions based upon the expressed views
or preferences of the electorate, a judge makes decisions based
upon the law and the facts of every case. Therefore, in
furtherance of this interest, judges and judicial candidates
must, to the greatest extent possible, be free and appear to be
free from political influence and political pressure. This Canon
imposes narrowly tailored restrictions upon the political and
campaign activities of all judges and judicial candidates, taking
into account the various methods of selecting judges."
The Supreme Court has distinguished the judiciary from the political
branches in some contexts, such as equal protection when applying the "one
person one vote" doctrine.56 However, in 2002, the Court failed to distinguish
between campaign speech in judicial campaigns and campaign speech during
campaigns for political office.57 In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
("White"), the Supreme Court held that a Minnesota canon of judicial conduct
prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing their opinions on political or
legal issues (known as an "announce clause") violated the First Amendment
right to free speech." White held that when utilizing any notion of impartiality,
the announce clause fails a strict scrutiny analysis. 59 Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, was concerned about the respondent's notion of what was meant
by "impartiality" and further explained that "[c]larity on this point is essential
before we can decide whether impartiality is indeed a compelling state interest,
54 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1-4 (2010).
5 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (2010).
56 Wells v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095, 1095-96 (1973).
5 See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
58 Id. at 765-66.
5 Id.
[Vol. 115416
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 16
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss1/16
A HORSE OF A DIFFERENT COLOR
and, if so, whether the announce clause is narrowly tailored to achieve it."60
Justice Scalia's opinion leaves open the issue of whether judicial elections
should be treated differently than elections to the political branches, writing:
[W]e neither assert nor imply that the First Amendment
requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as
those for legislative office. What we do assert, and what Justice
GINSBURG ignores, is that, even if the First Amendment
allows greater regulation of judicial election campaigns than
legislative election campaigns, the announce clause still fails
strict scrutiny because it is woefully underinclusive,
prohibiting announcements by judges (and would-be judges)
only at certain times and in certain forms.
Justice O'Connor, in concurrence, argued that judicial elections
themselves cause an appearance of impropriety and are a bad policy. 62
O'Connor cites Roscoe Pound from 1906: "compelling judges to become
politicians, in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional respect
for the bench."63 O'Connor was also concerned that judges may be influenced
by upcoming elections and wrote, "[e]ven if judges were able to suppress their
awareness of the potential electoral consequences of their decisions and refrain
from acting on it, the public's confidence in the judiciary could be undermined
simply by the possibility that judges would be unable to do so."6
Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg wrote dissenting opinions, both
joined by Justices Breyer and Souter, arguing that regulating speech in judicial
elections is entirely different from regulating speech in legislative and
executive elections. First, Justice Stevens dissented:
By obscuring the fundamental distinction between campaigns
for the judiciary and the political branches, and by failing to
recognize the difference between statements made in articles or
opinions and those made on the campaign trail, the Court
defies any sensible notion of the judicial office and the
importance of impartiality in that context ....
Elected judges, no less than appointed judges, occupy an office
of trust that is fundamentally different from that occupied by
policymaking officials. Although the fact that they must stand
for election makes their job more difficult than that of the
60 Id
61 Id. at 783.
62 Id. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63 Id. at 791 (citing Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration ofJustice, 8 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 23 (1956) (reprinting Pound's speech)).
6 Id. at 789.
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tenured judge, that fact does not lessen their duty to respect
essential attributes of the judicial office that have been
embedded in Anglo-American law for centuries.
There is a critical difference between the work of the judge and
the work of other public officials. In a democracy, issues of
policy are properly decided by majority vote; it is the business
of legislators and executives to be popular. But in litigation,
issues of law or fact should not be determined by popular vote;
it is the business of judges to be indifferent to unpopularity.65
Justice Stevens adamantly distinguished the judicial branch and argued
that not doing so goes against the grain of centuries of Anglo-American Law.
Similarly, Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent that judges are not representatives
or political actors:
I do not agree with this unilocular, "an election is an election,"
approach. Instead, I would differentiate elections for political
offices, in which the First Amendment holds full sway, from
elections designed to select those whose office it is to
administer justice without respect to persons. Minnesota's
choice to elect its judges, I am persuaded, does not preclude
the State from installing an election process geared to the
judicial office.
Legislative and executive officials serve in representative
capacities. They are agents of the people; their primary
function is to advance the interests of their constituencies.
Candidates for political offices, in keeping with their
representative role, must be left free to inform the electorate of
their positions on specific issues. . . . Judges, however, are not
political actors.6 6
Justice Scalia's majority opinion is directly at odds with the dissenters'
belief that the judiciary should be treated differently because judges are not
representatives. In White, Justice Scalia wrote:
This complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise of
"representative government" might have some truth in those
countries where judges neither make law themselves nor set
aside the laws enacted by the legislature. It is not a true picture
of the American system. Not only do state-court judges possess
65 Id. at 797-803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 805-06 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the power to "make" common law, but they have the immense
power to shape the States' constitutions as well.
Justice Scalia's take on whether judges are representatives was much
different when applying Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to judicial
districting. Justice Scalia's dissent in Chisom v. Roemer put forth a starkly
different notion of judges as representatives:
There is little doubt that the ordinary meaning of
'representatives" does not include judges. The Court's feeble
argument to the contrary is that "representatives" means those
who "are chosen by popular election." On that hypothesis, the
fan-elected members of the baseball all-star teams are
"representatives"-hardly a common, if even a permissible,
usage. Surely the word "representative" connotes one who is
not only elected by the people, but who also, at a minimum,
acts on behalf of the people. Judges do that in a sense-but not
in the ordinary sense. As the captions of the pleadings in some
States still display, it is the prosecutor who represents "the
People"; the judge represents the Law-which often requires
him to rule against the People. It is precisely because we do not
ordinarily conceive of judges as representatives that we held
judges not within the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of
"one person, one vote."6 8
In White, four of the nine justices (Ginsburg, Stevens, Breyer, and
Souter) believed First Amendment cases involving judicial elections should be
treated differently from elections for political offices, and another Justice
(O'Connor) questioned the entire judicial election process. White created more
questions than answers. The Court applied strict scrutiny to judicial campaign
speech, leaving lower courts to ascertain the validity of other parts of judicial
ethics codes from around the country. 6 9 The Court's ruling that judicial
67 Id. at 784.
68 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410-11 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Wells v.
Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973)); see also Mary Thrower Wickham, Note, Mapping the Morass:
Application of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to Judicial Elections, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1251 (1992).
69 See Richard L. Hasen, First Amendment Limits on Regulating Judicial Campaigns, in
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RIsING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 15 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007). For an argument that judges should be treated as
politicians because judges make policy decisions, see Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to
that Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians,
21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 301 (2003). The title of Dimino's article, like the title of this Note,
comes from the movie The Wizard of Oz. THE WIZARD OF Oz, supra note 1. I personally agree
that judges make policy decisions and have no problem with judges advancing policy. In fact,
every law school casebook is a book of judge-made law. Whether someone refers to the judge
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campaign speech is subject to strict scrutiny may cause many judicial rules of
ethics to come into constitutional question, including:70
a. Restrictions on pledges or promises, which are
unconstitutional for legislative and executive races.7'
b. Speech restrictions of sitting judges, such as not
allowing judges to campaign on behalf of others.
c. Limitations on personally raising campaign funds,
which many states have in their judicial codes of
conduct, but are unconstitutional for non-judicial
elections.7 2
d. Nonpartisan judicial elections and limitations on
political activities by judges and judicial candidates.
e. Restrictions on leftover campaign money going to
partisan elections.
made law as an "activist" ruling depends upon which side of the fence she is on. The problem
lies in the fact that judges make policy through the litigation process, and the role that judges
play represents none of the litigants. That is far different than the "representation" that dominates
the legislative and executive branches.
70 Hasen, supra note 69, at 17. For an analysis of how various provisions in judicial ethics
codes may be affected by White, see Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 181 (2004).
7 The remedy for violating the pledges or promises provision in West Virginia has been self-
recusal. For instance, in 2008, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals candidate Menis
Ketchum said the following while speaking to the West Virginia State Medical Association:
I think we have an obligation to comment on specific issues. Because if we
don't talk about specific issues, then how can you iudge whether to vote for
us or not. It's not enough for me to get up here and say "I'm a good guv. and
I'll consider it." And the law of land says we can comment on specific issues.
I do know about the Medical Professional Liability Act and each of its
reforms. The Medical Professional Liability Act is constitutional. I will not
vote to overturn it. I will not vote to change it. I will not vote to modify it.
That is my position.
Lawrence Smith, Supreme Court Candidates Speak at Medical Forum, W. VA. REC. (Feb. 13,
2008, 11:15 AM), http://www.wvrecord.com/news/207894-supreme-court-candidates-speak-at-
medical-forum. The speech is available online. Consumerforjustice, Menis Ketchum, YOUTUBE
(April 16, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-qLnnEdg5Kng. Upon being elected, Justice
Ketchum recused himself when the issue came before the court in MacDonald v. City Hosp.,
Inc., 715 S.E.2d 405, 425 (W. Va. 2011). Justice Ketchum is a former editor of the West Virginia
Law Review.
72 On remand, the Eighth Circuit in White, using a broad brush, struck down Minnestota's
judicial cannons against political activities. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738,
745 (8th Cir. 2005). The Eleventh Circuit struck down the ban on personally soliciting campaign
funds for judges in Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002), but the Tenth
Circuit declined to follow in Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011).
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f. Restrictions from associating with political
organizations and taking leadership roles in political
organizations.
If strict scrutiny is applied to the above activities, they are in danger of
being struck down, severely weakening the canons of judicial ethics. Most of
the rules of judicial ethics are in place to prevent judges from representing or
appearing to represent persons or groups.
As I discussed in Part I, the judiciary was not established as a
representative branch of government. Judges are not representatives and should
not be treated as such. Black's Law Dictionary defines "representative" as
"[o]ne who stands for or acts on behalf of another." 73 The judiciary is a distinct
branch of government because unlike legislators and executives in the political
branches, judges do not act as representatives. Rather, judges should be neutral
arbiters who interpret and apply the law. Although judges are sometimes
charged with making policy, judges do not make policy in a representative
capacity. The political branches are made up of elected representatives fighting
on behalf of their constituencies, as it should be, because a healthy democracy
requires politicians to represent their constituents. There is no such thing as a
judicial representative. Accordingly, the representative/political branches of
government must be distinguished from the judiciary.
Both the liberal and conservative wings of the Supreme Court have
made the argument that the judiciary should be distinguished from officials in
the political branches. Justice Scalia once made an argument similar to Justice
Ginsburg's and Justice Stevens's dissents in White. Justice Scalia, in a
dissenting opinion, interpreted the definition of "representatives" in a case
where voters sought to enforce Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act with respect
to judicial districting. Scalia emphatically rejected the notion of judges being
representatives and claimed that judges are no more representative than are
Major League Baseball fan selected all-stars.
This issue of whether "one person one vote" applies to judicial
elections came to the Court in Wells v. Edwards,76 which addressed whether or
not judges are "representatives." The "one person, one vote" jurisprudence
guarantees equally weighted votes (equal district size) and equal representation
for voters in the representative/political branches of government." Wells
7 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1416 (9th ed. 2009).
74 See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410-11 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
SId.
76 Wells v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973). See also Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 576
(N.D. Ga. 1964).
n Wells, 409 U.S. at 1095-96.
7 See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, 387 U.S. 50, 51 (1970); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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addressed whether Louisiana's scheme for electing its state supreme court
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by violating the equal protection rights of
some voters. 79 The Louisiana Supreme Court was elected by districts.8 0 Each
district voted only on candidates from within that district.8 ' The Louisiana
constitution set the State Supreme Court districts without regard to
population.82 The district court upheld the election scheme: "[j]udges do not
represent people, they serve people."83 Thus, the rationale behind the one-man,
one-vote principle, which evolved out of efforts to preserve a truly
representative form of government, was shown to be irrelevant to ensuring
equal "representation" in the judiciary."84 The Supreme Court summarily
affirmed Wells without opinion, although Justice White wrote a dissent joined
by Douglas and Marshall.
The well-grounded history of distinguishing the judiciary in both
selection methods and the speech regulations of office holders begs the
question of whether the judiciary should be distinguished with regard to
modem campaign finance jurisprudence.
III. THE BUCKLEY PARADIGM OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE
All campaign finance jurisprudence since the late 1970s has been
analyzed through a framework set 'forth in the landmark decision Buckley v.
Valeo.87 In Buckley, the Court took on various challenges to the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974.88 Those challenges
included challenges to: (1) limits on campaign contributions, (2) limits on
campaign expenditures, and (3) public financing.
79 Wells, 409 U.S. at 1095.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Wells, 409 U.S. at 1095.
8 Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 455 (M.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973).
84 Id (citing Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ohio 1960)).
85 Wells, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973).
86 Id. Justice White did not address whether judges are representatives, but rather he argued
that equal protection, and one person one vote doctrines do apply to the judiciary irrespective of
whether judges are representatives. Id.
87 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). Buckley is a per curium opinion that set
new precedent in many areas of election law. At over 138 pages in the United States Reports,
Buckley is the longest per curium opinion the Supreme Court has ever issued. LowENSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 26, at 680.
88 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 11 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2006)).
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A. Distinguishing Campaign Contributions and Expenditures
Buckley distinguished between campaign contributions and campaign
expenditures, holding that limits on campaign contributions are constitutional,
while limits on campaign expenditures violated First Amendment associational
and speech rights. 9 Campaign expenditures include all money that a candidate,
or campaign committee, spends to get elected. Independent expenditures
include money that a person or organization spends on getting someone else
elected or supporting an issue. These are distinguished from campaign
contributions whereby money is given directly to a candidate or candidate's
campaign committee.90
Campaign expenditure limits cap the overall speech that a candidate or
organization may use, and the Court found such caps to be unconstitutional. To
illustrate this point, the Court in a footnote states: "Being free to engage in
unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being
free to drive an automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of
gasoline." 9' The Court went on to say that even limits on independent
expenditures "fail[] to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming
the reality or appearance of corruption." 92 The Court distinguished campaign
expenditures from campaign contributions, finding that contribution limits were
constitutional because "[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the
integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined." 93 Thus
limitations on campaign finances are limited to contributions. In the current
state of campaign finance jurisprudence, overcoming these limitations for the
sake of judicial independence is no easy task.
B. The Compelling State Interest Against Corruption and the Appearance
of Corruption
For campaign finance regulations that affect constitutional rights to
pass constitutional muster, they must serve a compelling state interest.
Plausible state interests abound, including preventing or curing corruption,
preventing or curing the appearance of corruption, equalizing the playing field,
89 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 3.
90 Many scholars find that this is a distinction without a difference. See, e.g., Lillian R.
BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance
Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1045, 1063-65 (1985); David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo:
Eviscerating the Line Between Candidate Contributions and Independent Expenditures, 14 J.L. &
POL. 33, 35-51 (1998).
91 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 n.18.
92 Id. at 47-48.
93 Id. at 26-27.
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reducing incumbent advantage, reducing the amount of time candidates spend
fundraising, making elections more competitive, and limiting distortion of
claims made during campaigns. However, the Buckley Court found that the
only compelling state interests are the interests against corruption and the
appearance of corruption.
Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.
In CSC v. Letter Carriers, the Court found that the danger to
"fair and effective government" posed by partisan political
conduct on the part of federal employees charged with
administering the law was a sufficiently important concern to
justify broad restrictions on the employees' right of partisan
political association. Here, as there, Congress could
legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of
improper influence "is also critical . . . if confidence in the
system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a
disastrous extent."94
While the Supreme Court, since Buckley, has focused on corruption
and the appearance of corruption as compelling state interests, Zephyr
Teachout argues that the Constitution itself contains within it a freestanding
"anti-corruption principle."95 Teachout makes a compelling case that the Court
has weakened the historical constitutional treatment of corruption and that it
should not be treated as a compelling state interest but rather as a fundamental
constitutional principle.96 As a fundamental constitutional principle the court
should give corruption co-equal constitutional consideration with the First
Amendment. However, it is unlikely that courts will return to analyzing First
Amendment and anti-corruption concerns as coequals anytime in the near
future.
The Pilot Program's stated purposes are to eliminate the appearance of
corruption and foster independence and integrity on the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, but it is questionable whether it is a "representative" body.98
This constitutionality of the Pilot Program is analyzed in Part IV infra.
94 Id. at 27 (citing U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'1 Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
565 (1973).
9s Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 341, 342 (2009).
96 Id. at 346-72.
SId. at 345.
98 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-2 (LexisNexis 2011).
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C. Away From Balancing, Toward Strict Scrutiny
The Buckley Court struggled with the level of scrutiny to apply to First
Amendment issues in campaign finance, at times using the terms "rigorous
standard of review," 99 "exacting scrutiny,"'00 and "balancing,"' 0 ' but the Court
appeared to apply different levels of scrutiny to different issues that arose in the
case. In 2000, in Shrink Missouri, the Court rejected the use of strict scrutiny,
adopting a contextual analysis whereby "[t]he quantum of empirical evidence
needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary
up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised."
Following Shrink Missouri, the Roberts Court has weakened the tools with
which states can prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption through
campaign finance laws by applying strict scrutiny to speech issues, first in
Wisconsin Right to Life' 03 and then in Citizens United.'0
It is often stated that when the Court applies strict scrutiny it is "strict
in theory and fatal in fact." 05 Strict scrutiny requires a law that inhibits speech
to be struck down by the court unless it is shown that the law is narrowly
tailored to a compelling state interest.10 6 It is important to note that Citizens
United does not overturn Buckley but rather extends the paradigm set forth in
Buckley establishing that independent expenditures of corporations and unions
shall not be limited. The ban on expenditure limitations previously only applied
to natural persons.
Stevens addressed the issue of judicial elections in his Citizens United
dissent:
99 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29.
'00 Id. at 44.
101 Id. at 38.
102 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000).
103 Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (The Court
applied strict scrutiny and held that banning "electioneering communication" by a corporation in
the months prior to an election violated free speech. The law violated free speech because
Wisconsin Right to Life was airing issue only ads. It was still okay to limit candidate advocacy
ads.).
104 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). (The Court held that
restricting political spending of corporations violates the First Amendment. In other words, the
free speech protections with respect to campaign spending afforded to natural persons were
extended to non-natural persons.).
105 The phrase was first used by Gerald Gunther. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on A Changing Court: A Model for A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1972).
106 The fourth footnote in the Supreme Court case United States v. Carolene Products is
famous for introducing levels of judicial scrutiny, including strict scrutiny. United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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[T]oday's holding will not be limited to the legislative or
executive context. The majority of the States select their judges
through popular elections. At a time when concerns about the
conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever pitch, the
Court today unleashes the floodgates of corporate and union
general treasury spending in these races. Perhaps "Caperton
motions" will catch some of the worst abuses. This will be
small comfort to those States that, after today, may no longer
have the ability to place modest limits on corporate
electioneering even if they believe such limits to be critical to
maintaining the integrity of their judicial systems.107
D. Strict Scrutiny Should Not Apply to Judicial Campaign Speech
Strict scrutiny should not apply to the regulation of judicial speech,
judicial campaign speech, or judicial campaign spending. Because the judiciary
plays a different role in our system of governance, states should be given
greater leeway in drafting regulations to uphold the integrity and impartiality of
the courts and prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption. The reason
strict scrutiny (as opposed to a less stringent level of scrutiny) is applied to
most campaign finance law is because citizens have a great interest in choosing
who represents them. And since judges are not representatives, there is less
constitutional protection in judicial campaign speech than in political campaign
speech. Just as equal protection concerns are diminished with respect to judicial
elections because judges do not represent constituents, so too is the speech of
such non-constituent statements. Applying strict scrutiny to judicial campaign
speech threatens provisions in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Not
surprisin ly, some courts have resisted applying strict scrutiny to judicial
speech. 1o
The Seventh Circuit recently applied a balancing approach in deciding
whether a judicial candidate can endorse candidates in the political branches
and upheld a law against it, reasoning that judges are akin to government
employees.1 09 Strict scrutiny does not apply to the regulation of political speech
107 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (internal citations omitted.).
108 Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974,983 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (U.S.
2011). See also Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2872
(2011) (applying a balancing test to judicial canons including political activities clauses, a clause
against soliciting campaign donations, and a clause against committing how a candidate would
rule in a specific case); Wolfson v. Brammer, 822 F. Supp. 2d 925 (D. Ariz. 2011) (applying a
balancing test to judicial ethics rules against personal solicitation of contributions and against
candidates' participation in other candidate's campaigns).
109 Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 983 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (U.S.
2011).
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by government employees under the Hatch Act,11o rather it is subject to a
balancing test."' The West Virginia Court also compared the level of speech
regulation of public employees with that of judges when evaluating a violation
of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct:
Judges are not typical, run-of-the-bureaucracy employees, nor
does our oversight of judicial disciplinary proceedings present
us with an employment context. Moreover, the State's interests
in regulating judicial conduct are both of a different nature and
of a greater weight than those implicated in the usual
government employment case. The State has compelling
interests in maintaining the integrity, independence, and
impartiality of the judicial system-and in maintaining the
appearance of the same-that justify unusually stringent
restrictions on judicial expression, both on and off the bench.
As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, a "state may
restrict the speech of elected judges in ways that it may not
restrict the speech of other elected officials."
Despite these differences, the public employee-free speech
cases provide an appropriate analogy in this case because the
clash of interests requires us to engage in a similar balancing
process. It is the same approach we have taken in considering
the impact of disciplinary rules on lawyers' speech." 2
Justice Cleckley recognized that not applying a balancing test to the
regulation of judicial campaign speech seriously threatened much of the code
of judicial conduct. The United States Supreme Court should extend this type
of balancing to the regulation of campaign spending in judicial elections, in
which free speech concerns must be balanced with concerns of judicial
independence.
Even if strict scrutiny is applied, states should be able to tailor a
number of policies to prevent the appearance of corruption, although the
policies may violate free speech if applied to the political branches. This
distinction in application arises because the state interest of maintaining an
appearance of independence in the judiciary is a compelling interest that does
not exist in the political branches. Parts IV and V of this Note demonstrate that
West Virginia has a problem with the appearance of impropriety of its judiciary
110 The Hatch Political Activities Act of July 19, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-753 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326 (2006)).
I Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 79 (1947) (assessing the constitutionality of The Hatch Political Activities Act of
July 19, 1940).
112 Matter ofHey, 192 W. Va. 221, 227, 452 S.E.2d 24, 30 (1994) (citing Scott v. Flowers, 910
F.2d 201, 212 (5th Cir.1990)) (emphasis added).
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and that efforts to remedy such problems, like the Pilot Program, are narrowly
tailored to serve that purpose.
IV. THE CAPERTON CONUNDRUM AND THE EROSION OF TRUST IN THE
JUDICIARY
I've been around West Virginia long enough to know that
politicians don't stay bought, particularly ones that are going
to be in office for 12 years .... So I would never go out and
spend money to try to gain favor with a politician. Eliminating
a bad politician makes sense. Electing somebody hoping he's
going to be in your favor doesn't make any sense at all.
-Don Blankenship'13
In 2004, wealthy coal baron and former Massey Energy CEO Don
Blankenship spent over three million dollars of his own money on the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals race to defeat incumbent Justice Warren
McGraw.1 14 Blankenship gave $2.5 million to "And for the Sake of the Kids,"
an organization formed to run attack ads against Justice Warren McGraw." 5
The group's strategy was clear: audactercalumniare, semper aliquidhaeret
(slander boldly, something always sticks). Blankenship spent another $500,000
soliciting support for Brent Benjamin."'6 Blankenship's expenditures exceeded
both Democratic candidate Warren McGraw's and Republican candidate Brent
113 Adam Liptak, Case May Alter Judge Elections Across Country, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb 14, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/washington/I 5scotus.html?ref -washington.
114 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). This case, along with the 2004
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals election, is widely rumored to be the inspiration of
John Grisham's bestselling novel The Appeal. See Rawan Jabaji, 5 Things You Need to Know
About... Massey CEO Don Blankenship, NEED TO KNow oN PBS (May 20, 2010),
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/five-things/massey-ceo-don-blankenship/842/. For other
scholarly articles focused on the West Virginia judiciary, see Brian P. Anderson, Note, Judicial
Elections in West Virginia: "By the People, for the People" or "By the Powerful, for the
Powerful?" A Choice Must Be Made, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 235 (2004); Richard A. Brisbin, Jr. &
John C. Kilwein, The Future of the West Virginia Judiciary: Problem and Policy Options, 24 W.
VA. PuB. AFF. REP. 2 (2007); Starcher, supra note 41 (West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
Justice Larry Starcher arguing for partisan judicial elections). For an inside look at Warren
McGraw's 2004 campaign for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, see THE LAST
CAMPAIGN (Wayne Ewing 2005), a documentary that follows McGraw through each stage of the
campaign and compares it to his first campaign for office in 1972 which was portrayed in another
documentary by Wayne Ewing IF ELECTED (Wayne Ewing 1972).
115 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873. This was before Citizens United when Massey Energy was
itself barred from campaign spending. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010). After Citizen's United, Massey Energy may directly donate to campaigns and
political action committees.
116 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873.
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Benjamin's campaign committees combined by one million dollars." 7
Benjamin won the election, becoming the first Republican elected to a full term
to the WV Supreme Court since 1928.118 The controversy over the election is
not only due to the amount of money that Blankenship spent, but also the fact
that Massey Energy was at the time appealing a $50 million verdict to the five-
member West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, and Blankenship knew that
the election may affect that appeal.1 9 Benjamin refused to recuse himself from
the Massey suit. In 2007, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
overturned the verdict with Justice Benjamin in the 3-2 majority, saving
Massey over $50 million.120
After the 2007 reversal, the Charleston Gazette uncovered photographs
of another justice, Elliot "Spike" Maynard, vacationing with Don Blankenship
on the French Riviera in 2006 while Caperton was appealing the case to the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.121 Upon this revelation, Justice
Maynard recused himself from a rehearing. 2 2 Caperton also moved again for
Justice Benjamin to recuse himself, but Benjamin refused. Another justice,
Larry V. Starcher, also recused himself from the rehearing because he publicly
criticized Don Blankenship, Brent Benjamin, and Spike Maynard for their roles
in the debacle.12 3 After Justices Starcher and Maynard recused themselves,
Justice Brent Benjamin, while acting as chief justice, appointed two judges to
fill those vacancies.12 4 Once again the court in a 3-2 decision ruled in favor of
Massey, with Justice Benjamin again in the majority.
In 2009, the United States Supreme Court heard arguments to
determine whether due process required Justice Benjamin to recuse himself.
The court looked to whether Caperton's due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment were violated by Benjamin ruling on the case. Justice
Kennedy cited his concurrence in White: "The citizen's respect for judgments
depends in turn upon the issuing court's absolute probity. Judicial integrity is,
117 id
11 One Republican Justice, Charles Haden (former editor of the West Virginia Law Review),
was elected to a short term in 1972 after having been appointed by Governor Arch Moore.
"9 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873.
120 Id. at 874.
121 Id.
122 id
123 Id. at 875.
124 Jennifer Bundy, Justice Benjamin Appoints Judge Fox to Massey Case, W. VA. S. CT.
APPEALS (Feb. 15, 2008), http://www.courtswv.gov/public-resources/press/releases/2008-
releases/febl5c_08.htm. Benjamin was the Acting Chief Justice filling in for Maynard. In West
Virginia, it is the role of the Chief Justice or Acting Chief Justice to fill vacancies "in his or her
discretion." W. VA. R. APP. P. 33(h).
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in consequence, a state interest of the highest order."l2 5 The Court held that due
process required Benjamin to recuse himself because Blankenship's
expenditures created a "debt of gratitude" from Benjamin to Blankenship,
creating an appearance of bias and a serious risk of actual bias.126 The Court
went on to say that "[n]ot every campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney
creates a probability of bias that requires a judge's recusal, but this is an
exceptional case." 2 7 Nor must the contribution be a "but for" cause of being
elected, or actual bias proven.128 Rather, the proper analysis is made by taking
all of the circumstances into account and inquiring into whether there was an
objective risk of bias to the average judge in such circumstances.129
The Kennedy opinion held:
Although there is no allegation of a quid pro quo agreement,
but the extraordinary contributions were made at a time when
Blankenship had a vested stake in the outcome. Just as no man
is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias
can arise when-without the other parties' consent-a man
chooses the judge in his own cause. And applying this
principle to the judicial election process, there was here a
serious, objective risk of actual bias that required Justice
Benjamin's recusal.130
Justice Kennedy then backtracked from that statement when deciding Citizens
United:
[Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,] is not to the contrary.
Caperton held that a judge was required to recuse himself
"when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge
125 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889 (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 556 U.S. 765, 779
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
126 Id. at 882-86.
127 Id. at 883.
128 Id. at 885-86.
129 For analysis of various judicial recusal standards, see Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial
Disqualification After Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company: What's Due Process Got to Do
with It?, 63 BAYLOR L. REv. 368, 369 (2011); Eric Sandberg-Zakian, Rethinking "Bias": Judicial
Elections and the Due Process Clause After Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 64 ARK. L. REV.
179 (2011).
130 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886. Former West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Richard Neely
gave his opinion on how he would solve the case: "This is how I would conclude the opinion if I
were on the Supreme Court. There has been a due process violation in this case and the rule is:
When you see an owl at a mouse picnic, you know he didn't come for the sack races." Richard
Neely, Judicial Elections and Due Process, AM. CONST. Soc'Y (Feb. 26, 2009),
http://blip.tv/american-constitution-society/judicial-elections-and-due-process-480243 2 (quote is
at 33 minutes 20 seconds).
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on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election
campaign when the case was pending or imminent." The
remedy of recusal was based on a litigant's due process right to
a fair trial before an unbiased judge. Caperton's holding was
limited to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the
litigant's political speech could be banned.131
The Roberts Court is determined to apply strict scrutiny to campaign
finance laws, but Caperton presents a problem because the Court in Caperton
indicated that independent campaign expenditures in a judicial election can
cause an appearance of impropriety.132 If independent expenditures can cause
an appearance of impropriety in judicial elections as Caperton claims, then
under a Buckley paradigm, a state would be on firm constitutional footing
regulating speech in pursuit of preventing and eliminating such an appearance
of judicial corruption arising out of independent campaign expenditures. In
Caperton, Justice Kennedy, upon concluding that "[j]udicial integrity is, in
consequence, a state interest of the highest order," admitted that there was an
appearance of impropriety that arose from independent expenditures. 133 Then,
in Citizen's United, Justice Kennedy stated that the expenditures only required
the recusal of Justice Benjamin and did not pertain to speech in elections.134 It
is true that Caperton concerned due process and not the First Amendment. No
state law tried to hinder Blankenship's speech; thus the court could not rule on
whether such a law could do so. The Pilot Program gives the courts a chance to
assess whether the appearance of impropriety or corruption it found in
Caperton could be addressed by regulating campaign finance.
A. Charleston, We Have a Problem: The Appearance ofJudicial
Impropriety
This crisis of confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary is
real and growing. Left unaddressed, the perception that justice
is for sale will undermine the rule of law that the courts are
supposed to uphold.
-Retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 35
131 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (citations omitted)
(quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 885).
132 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886.
133 Id. at 889 (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)).
134 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
13 Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreword to JAMES SAMPLE ET. AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 2000--2009: DECADE OF CHANGE i (2010), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/the new-politics ofjudicial-elections/. The
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We figured out a long time ago that it's easier to elect seven
judges than to elect 132 legislators.
_Ohio AFL-CIO Official3 6
West Virginians have lost faith in the independence of the state
supreme court. Even prior to the 2004 election, West Virginians were weary of
the judicial selection process. In 1995, 56% of West Virginians said their
confidence in the legal system now, as compared to five years earlier,
decreased, while only 6% said that their confidence in the legal system had
increased. 37 In a January 1998, poll West Virginians were asked about their
preferred judicial selection methods, and West Virginians chose as follows:
38% for nonpartisan elections, 35% for partisan elections, and 19% for
gubernatorial appointments.' 3 8 In 2008, when Mark Blankenship Enterprises
asked a similar question, the support for partisan elections dropped to 19%,
with 37% choosing merit selection and 36% choosing nonpartisan elections. 3 9
In that same poll, 60% of respondents disagreed with the statement that partisan
elections create a fair court system.14 0 In 2005, the West Virginia Institute for
Public Affairs polled West Virginia circuit judges, magistrates and family court
judges and found that a majority of circuit jud es, magistrates, and family court
judges supported elections over appointments.
In 2010, Justice at Stake conducted a poll in West Virginia asking
many questions about the judiciary.14 2 When asked about the degree to which
campaign contributions affect judicial decisions, only 5% of respondents
believed they had no influence, while 41% said that contributions had some
influence, and 37% said contributions had a great deal of influence. When
project was a joint effort among the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School
of Law, the Justice at Stake Campaign, and the National Institute on Money in State Politics. Id.
136 J. Christopher Heagarty, The Changing Face of Judicial Elections, 7 N.C. ST. B.J. 20, 21
(2002).
1 Ryan, McGinn Samples Research Inc., Records from Polling the Nations The West
Virginia Poll, June 1995.
138 Ryan, McGinn Samples Research Inc., Records from Polling the Nations, The West
Virginia Poll, Jan. 1998.
139 MARK BLANKENSHIP ENTERPRISES, MBE PRESENTATION TO GOVERNOR'S INDEPENDENT
COMMIssION ON JUDICIAL REFORM AND FORMER U.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICE SANDRA DAY
O'CONNOR (2009), available at http://www.markblankenship.com/web/news/
Independent%2OCommission%20on%2OJudicial%2OReform%20Presentation%2OFinal.pdf (poll
conducted in August 2008).
' Id.
141 Brisbin & Kilwein, supra note 114, at 4. Note that most of those in the poll were elected,
so it is no surprise that judges dance to the song that got them their office.
142 ANZALONE LISZT RESEARCH, INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE: WEST VIRGINIA -2010 POLL (2010),
available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/WestVirginia_Poll_Results_674E634FDBl3F.pdf.
432 [Vol. 115
32
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 16
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss1/16
A HORSE OF A DIFFERENT COLOR
asked about independent groups spending $50,000 or more on a candidate, 76%
believed it was a serious problem.
Interestingly, the surveyors sought to measure the effect of hearing
about the Blankenship-Benjamin affair by asking a series of questions,
explaining details of the Blankenship-Benjamin relationship, then asking those
same series of questions. 14 3 After running through the questions, respondents
were told:
As you may know, in two thousand four Massey Coal
corporation owner [sic] Don Blankenship spent three million
dollars through a third party group to help elect Brent
Benjamin as Supreme Court justice. Then when Massey Coal
went to trial for a separate matter, Justice Benjamin did not
remove himself from the case and ruled in favor of Massey
Coal. 144
Sixty-eight percent of West Virginians believed that candidates
receiving contributions from potential litigants was a serious or very serious
problem. 145 After being exposed to the above paragraph, that number jumped
to 89%. When asked about public financing of elections, 52% supported it
while 39% opposed it. 14 6 But upon being exposed to the above paragraph,
support for public financing jumped to 61%, and opposition dropped to 30%.147
These data indicate that knowledge of the 2004 election and the subsequent
refusal of Benjamin to recuse himself decreased confidence in the judiciary.
While much of the lack of trust in the independence of the judiciary
stems from the Blankenship-Benjamin affair, it may run much deeper. Between
2000 and 2009, West Virginia's Supreme Court elections have become one of
the costliest in the nation when considering the amount of money candidates
raised per general election vote.148 In that time period, West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals candidates raised and spent far more money per general
election vote than other states. 149 In West Virginia, candidates raised $2.80 per
general election vote. Even knowing that candidate funding in West Virginia
court elections is far outside the norm, it pales in comparison to the amount of
143 The survey implemented a quasi-experiment designed to test the effect of knowing about
the Blankenship-Benjamin affair by first asking a series of questions on judicial issues followed
by a stimulus (reading the paragraph above) and then re-asking the questions. Id.
1" This is the exact language from the survey. Massey Energy was a public company, and
Blankenship, although a large shareholder, was not "the owner"; rather he was the CEO. Id.
145 id
146 id.
147 id.
148 The data on expenditures were retrieved from SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 135. The data on
state general elections were retrieved from the respective secretaries of states websites.
149 See supra Figure 3.
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money Don Blankenship spent in relation to the number of votes Benjamin
received in 2004."so Don Blankenship spent almost eight dollars per each Brent
Benjamin vote.
Historically, general elections to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals were not very competitive from the mid-1930s through 2000."' The
decade that followed has had multiple competitive elections. 152 This rise in
campaign spending and accompanying lack of faith in the judiciary is reflected
on the national level as well. 15 3 In the past, judicial elections had been low-key
affairs, but things changed in the 1990s and 2000s when a nationwide battle
over tort reform engulfed court races. 154 Pro-business groups sought to limit
injured plaintiffs' access to the civil justice system as well as the damages that
injured plaintiffs could receive.15s All the while, plaintiffs' attorneys and unions
spent vast resources to halt the imposition of such limits on the civil justice
system.15 6
After controlling for inflation, the amount spent of money raised and
spent by judicial candidates on judicial elections has skyrocketed since 1990.157
The rise in spending is most prominent in partisan judicial elections, which are
more costly than nonpartisan elections.158 Along with candidate expenditures,
independent expenditures have risen, resulting in far more television ads.159
Furthermore, the ads have become more negative, especially those paid for by
independent groups.1 60 Just as spending has increased, confidence in the
independence of the judiciary has decreased, and confidence in state courts is
lower in states with partisan elections than in states with other selection
150 See supra Figure 4.
151 See supra Figure 5.
152 While spending and competitiveness are associated, the causal direction of that relationship
is difficult to parcel out. Does more money make the election competitive, or do competitive
elections result in more money being spent? The relationship is likely reciprocal. See generally
Chris W. Bonneau, The Effects of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections, 60 POL.
REs. Q. 489 (2007).
. See SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 135.
154 Id. at 14.
' Id.
156 id.
1s7 Id. at 5 (figure one). See also Chis W. Bonneau, The Dynamics of Campaign Spending in
State Supreme Court Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND
LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 69, at 63-65 [hereinafter Dynamic of
Campaign Spending]; CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 30-33 (Routledge 2009).
158 Dynamics of Campaign Spending, supra note 157, at 65-66.
159 SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 135, at 24-31.
160 id.
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methods.16 ' National polls show that about three quarters of Americans believe
that campaign contributions to judges impact their decisions. 16 2
B. Impartial Courts Are a National Concern
A 2009 USA Today/Gallup Poll found that 89% of Americans believe
the influence of campaign contributions on judges' rulings is a problem, with
52% believing it is a major problem.16 3 More than 90% said judges should be
removed from a case if it involves a campaign contributor.1 64 This distrust of
judges when it comes to deciding cases involving campaign contributors may
only be exacerbated by the recent surge in spending on negative campaign
advertisement in judicial races.165
Judges across the United States are also concerned by both the rise of
campaign spending and the impact of increased spending on judicial
independence. Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court Wallace Jefferson
wrote in the Houston Chronicle:
In a close race, the judge who solicits the most money from
lawyers and their clients has the upper hand. But then the day
of reckoning comes. When you appear before a court, you ask
how much your lawyer gave to the judge's campaign. If the
*166
opposing counsel gave more, you are cynical.
A Republican Ohio Supreme Court Justice, Paul Pfiefer, who had previously
run for office in non-judicial elections, compared how it felt running for
judicial office and non-judicial office:
I never felt so much like a hooker down by the bus station in
any race I've been in as I did in a judicial race . . .. Everyone
interested in contributing has very specific interests. They
mean to be buying a vote .... Whether they succeed or not,
it's hard to say.'6 7
161 Sara C. Benesh, Understanding Public Confidence in American Courts, 68 J. POL. 697, 704
(2006) (using a 1999 survey).
162 Id.
163 Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Case with the Feel of a Best Seller, USA TODAY, Feb 16,
2009, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-02-16-grisham-courtN.htm.
164 Id.
165 SAMPLE ET AL.,supra note 135, at 24-31.
166 Wallace B. Jefferson, Make Merit Matter by Electing New System of Selecting Judges,
Hous. CHRON., Mar. 21, 2009, http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Wallace-B-
Jefferson-Make-merit-matter-by-I 544078.php.
167 Adam Liptak & Jane Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors High Court's Ruling, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01judges.html.
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A 2001 national survey of 2,428 state and local judges found that 55%
thought the tone of judicial campaigns had gotten worse in the past five years
while only 8% thought the tone had improved.16 1 Seventy-four percent of
judges are concerned that "nearly half of all supreme court cases involve
someone who has given money to one or more of the judges hearing the
case."l 69 Eighty-four percent of state court judges are concerned that there are
"few restrictions on special interest groups who buy advertising to influence the
outcome of judicial elections and decisions."o70 Also, 84% of judges are
concerned that special interest groups attempt to use the courts as a means to
their public policy ends.'
These attitudes have led to support for reform among judges. Fifty-six
percent of judges themselves believe that "judges should be prohibited from
presiding over and ruling in cases when one of the sides has given money to
their campaign." 72 Sixty percent of judges would support public financing for
judicial elections while only 29% would oppose public financing. 73 However,
only 45% of judges would support a merit selection plan with retention
elections, while 50% would oppose such a plan.174
While there is great concern for judicial independence, we must ask if
there is any actual connection between campaign spending and judicial rulings.
Not surprisingly, there is empirical evidence that shows a strong association
between interest group donations and how a judge votes.175 For instance, after
controlling for a host of variables, one scholar found that for each million
dollars a judge receives in campaign donations from insurance companies in a
partisan election, that judge is 87% more likely to rule in favor of the original
defendant in a tort case.17 6 It is important to note that a regression model
finding an association between campaign spending and judicial voting, while
demonstrative of a link between spending and voting, does not show a causal
relationship. 7 7 Furthermore, should a causal relationship exist, a regression
model like the one used cannot parcel out the direction of the causality. In other
words, do judges rule a certain way because of how much money they received
168 GREENBERG QuINLIN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE: STATE JUDGES POLL 3
(2001-2002), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASJudgesSurvey
Results_EA8838C0504A5.pdf.
169 Id at 9.
170 Id
171 Id.
172 Idatl11.
1 Id at 12.
174 Id. at 13.
17s Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623 (2009).
176 Id. at 671-72.
n7 Id. at 672.
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from certain groups, or do interest groups give to judges because of the way
they are going to rule? My guess is the relationship is reciprocal and works
both ways.
When I asked one West Virginia attorney in 2012 why he was giving
the maximum donation to a Supreme Court candidate running for reelection
who has vast personal wealth that she is spending on the campaign, he said, "It
is not that I think she has a realistic chance of losing, or that she needs the
money, but I just got a favorable judgment from the Supreme Court and I don't
want that to stop."
In response to the appearance of corruption, many states have
implemented various reforms. West Virginia has responded, and its reforms are
outlined next.
V. THE WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS PUBLIC CAMPAIGN
FINANCING PILOT PROGRAM PASSES CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER
The courts of this state shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him, in his person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law; and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay.
-The Constitution of West Virginia'
As a response to the fallout from Caperton v. Massey, in 2010, the
West Virginia Legislature passed the Pilot Program, setting up a voluntary
public financing option for West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
candidates in the 2012 election.17 9 The stated purpose of the legislation is
codified:
178 W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17 (emphasis added).
1' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-1 (LexisNexis 2011). This piece of legislation was sponsored by
and introduced by former West Virginia Law Review editor and current Speaker of the House of
Delegates Richard Thompson. Former Governor Joe Manchin championed the bill and the bill
passed along party lines with Democrats supporting the bill and Republicans opposing. 2010 W.
Va. Laws Ch. 72 (H.B. 4130). The votes for the House of Delegates can be found at House of
Delegates Votes for Creating the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Public Campaign
Financing Pilot Program, W. VA. LEGISLATURE (March 13, 2010),
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/legisdocs/2010/RS/votes/house/00395.pdf. CREATING THE WEST
VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING PILOT PROGRAM, WEST
VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, H.B. 4130, 2010 Reg. Sess., (2010), available at
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/legisdocs/2010/RS/votes/house/00150.pdf. It should also be noted
that the trial lawyers' organization, West Virginia Association for Justice, supported the passage
of the Pilot Program while the Chamber of Commerce opposed it. Timothy C. Bailey, Their
View: Trial Lawyers Support Public Financing, W. VA. REC., Mar. 18, 2010, 10:00 AM,
http://www.wvrecord.com/arguments/225445-their-view-trial-lawyers-support-public-financing.
The Pilot Program was proposed by the West Virginia Independent Commission on Judicial
Reform convened by Governor Joe Manchin. It was a blue ribbon commission with former
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The detrimental effects of spending large amounts by
candidates and independent parties are especially problematic
in judicial elections because impartiality is uniquely important
to the integrity and credibility of courts; An alternative public
campaign financing option for candidates running for a seat on
the Supreme Court of Appeals will ensure the fairness of
democratic elections in this state, protect the Constitutional
rights of voters and candidates from the detrimental effects of
increasingly large amounts of money being raised and spent to
influence the outcome of elections, protect the impartiality and
integrity of the judiciary, and strengthen public confidence in
the judiciary.'80
The West Virginia legislature found the impartiality and integrity of the
judiciary to be a vital interest in need of protection.' 8 ' Upon finding an increase
in expenditures for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals elections
coupled with the fallout from the Caperton v. Massey affair, the legislature
acted by starting a public financing pilot program for the 2012 elections.18 2 The
legislature most likely opted for this reform because switching to the
appointment of judges would have required a constitutional amendment'83 that
would be unlikely to pass a two-thirds majority of both houses and a statewide
public vote.184
Under the Pilot Program, candidates wishing to participate in the public
financing program must raise between $35,000 and $50,000 in qualifying
contributions from at least 500 registered voters in West Virginia. 85 All
qualifying contributions must be between $1 and $100, and a minimum of 10%
of all qualifying contributors must be individuals registered to vote in each of
United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor as the honorary chair. See W. VA.
INDEP. COMM'N ON JUDICIAL REFORM, FINAL REPORT (2009), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/22604435/West-Virginia-Independent-Commission-on-Judicial-
Reform-Final-Report.
180 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-2(8-(9) (emphasis added).
181 Id. § 3-12-2(10).
182 Id. § 3-12-1.
183 The West Virginia Constitution requires that the Supreme Court of Appeals be elected:
"The justices shall be elected by the voters of the state for a term of twelve years, unless sooner
removed or retired as authorized in this article. The Legislature may prescribe by law whether the
election of such justices is to be on a partisan or nonpartisan basis." W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
While the Constitution of West Virginia has required the election of justices since its adoption in
1872, in 1974 it was amended to note that the legislature could choose to have the judges elected
by partisan or nonpartisan elections. ROBERT M. BASTRESs, THE WEST VIRGINIA STATE
CONSTITUTION 224-25 (2011).
184 West Virginians do not support an appointed judiciary. Public opinions are discussed supra
Part IV.
185 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-9(a), (c).
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the three congressional districts.' 86 In a contested primary, qualified candidates
receive $200,000 minus the qualifying contributions.18 7 In an uncontested
primary, qualified candidates receive $50,000 minus the qualifying
contributions.'" In the general election, qualified candidates receive $35,000 if
it is uncontested and $350,000 if it is contested.189 Qualified candidates may
receive matching funds based upon independent expenditures or privately
financed candidate expenditures that exceed the initial allotment by 20% or
more.190 The State Election Commission decides whether that threshold has
been met and may release additional funds to publicly financed candidates not
to exceed an additional $400,000 in a primary election and $700,000 in a
general election.' 9 ' If the fund has been depleted of money and candidates are
not able to receive matching funds, then candidates can raise their own funds
up to the unfunded amount.
In response to the Arizona Free Enterprise Club decision discussed
below, West Virginia Attorney General Darrell McGraw issued an opinion to
Secretary of State Natalie Tennant's office on the legality of the Pilot Program,
claiming that it is unconstitutional citing Arizona Free Enterprise Club.19 3
Attorney General McGraw reasoned that "nothing in the recent jurisprudence
of the United States Supreme Court would lead us to predict a 'judicial
exception' to the Court's political speech line of cases." 9 4 McGraw went on to
misstate the Supreme Court's reasoning by claiming "[i]f combating corruption
is not a compelling state interest-and the Court held in no uncertain terms in
Arizona Free Enterprise Club that it is not-we cannot envision it finding the
perception of possible judicial partiality to be sufficient."' 9 5 As will be
discussed below, the Supreme Court did state that corruption and the
appearance of corruption are compelling state interests, but the Arizona law
was not narrowly tailored to that interest.196 West Virginia Secretary of State,
186 Id.
187 Id § 3-12-11(a)(1).
18 Id § 3-12-11(a)(2).
18 Id. § 3-12-11(b)(1)-(2).
190 Id. § 3-12-11(g).
'' Id. § 3 -12 -11I(g)-h).
192 Id. § 3-12-1l(d).
193 Letter from Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., W. Va. Att'y Gen., to Natalie E. Tennant, W. Va.
Sec'y of State, (July 28, 2011), available
at http://www.sos.wv.gov/news/topics/elections-candidates/Documents/July%2028,%202011%
20-%20AG%2OSupCo%2OPublic%20Financing% 200pinion.PDF [hereinafter Letter from W.
Va. Att'y Gen. McGraw].
194 Id at 4.
195 Id
196 Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011).
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Natalie Tennant, indicated that she would not follow the Pilot Program as
passed by the West Virginia Legislature, but rather she would follow the
opinion of Attorney General McGraw.197 The state had in essence decided to
"declare the bread stale before it has baked."' 9 8 Only one of the 2012
candidates (Democrat-turned-Independent-turned-Republican Allen Loughry)
qualified for the Pilot Program.
In July 2012, after candidate Justice Robin Davis triggered the
matching funds by spending more than $420,000 since the primary, the SEC
met to decide whether to disperse the funds.199 Although the Pilot Program
gave the SEC no discretion on whether to release matching funds once
triggered, the SEC, in a 2-2 vote, chose not to disperse the funds.200
Subsequently, two lawsuits were filed regarding the Pilot Program. First,
Michael Callaghan sought to enjoin the SEC from dispersing the matching
funds in federal court.2 0 1 Soon after, candidate Allen Loughry sought a writ of
mandamus in the West Virginia State Supreme Court to compel the SEC and
the Secretary of State to follow the law. 2 The West Virginia Supreme Court
heard oral arguments on September 4, 2012, and struck down the matching
203funds provision three days later.
While the reason for public financing itself is to prevent the appearance
of impropriety, the reason for a matching funds provision is to provide an
efficient way to price judicial elections as opposed to just setting a high flat rate
of public financing. Without a matching funds provision the legislature has the
option of draining the state's coffers by allotting a high set rate of public
financing, setting a low rate that no candidate will participate in it, or not
engaging in public financing at all.
19 Interestingly, the only 2012 candidate for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
who qualified for public financing was Allen Loughry who used to work for Attorney General
McGraw and now works for the West Virginia Supreme Court as a clerk. However, Attorney
General McGraw and Allen Loughry are not political bedfellows. In Loughry's book on the
history of corruption in West Virginia, Loughry dedicated a chapter to brothers Darrell and
Warren McGraw, both of whom have served on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
LOUGHRY, supra note 36, at 178.
198 This phrase comes from a statute of limitations case. Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 96
A.D.2d 825, 826 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
1 Phil Kabler, Statehouse Beat: The Election Financing Circus, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE
(July 22, 2012), http://www.wvrecord.com/news/207894-supreme-court-candidates-speak-at-
medical-forum. http://wvgazette.com/News/PhilKabler/201207220033.
200 Id.
201 See Complaint, Callaghan v. Tennant, No. 12-0899, 2012 WL 3011022 (S.D. W. Va. July
18, 2012).
202 State ex rel. Loughry v. Tennant, No. 12-0899, 2012 WL 3892747 (W. Va. Sept. 7, 2012).
203 Id.
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Buckley upheld public financing because the limits to expenditures on
the part of candidates accepting public financing were voluntary.2 04 The Court
looked only at the federal public financing law for presidential elections, which
appropriates a set amount of money to those candidates accepting public
financing in the general election and appropriates funds to primary candidates
based upon how much private money the candidates raise. 205 The Court
reasoned that public financing expands speech rather than inhibits it: "[Public
financing] is a congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech,
but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and
participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people.
Thus, [public financing] furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amendment
values. 06
Arizona Free Enterprise Club brought to a more conservative Court the
issue of conditioning public finances based upon what opposing candidates or
independent organizations spend.
A. Arizona Free Enterprise Club
In Arizona Free Enterprise Club, Justice Roberts applied the strict
scrutiny outlined in Citizen 's United and held that a matching funds provision,
under which a candidate's allotment of public financing is determined by
opponent spending, substantially burdens political speech and thus is
unconstitutional.2 07 The Court reasoned that a matching funds provision is in
essence akin to an expenditure limit.20 8 Arizona Free Enterprise Club also held
that Arizona's anticorruption interest in its legislature and executive offices
does not justify the substantial burden on the speech of privately financed
candidates and independent spenders.2 09 The Court reached its conclusion by
applying Buckley and Citizens United:
We have also held that "independent expenditures ... do not
give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption. By
definition, an independent expenditure is political speech
presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a
candidate." The candidate-funding circuit is broken. The
204 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 86 (1976).
205 Id at 89.
206 Id. at 92-93.
207 Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828 (2011). For
a comprehensive discussion of matching funds (also called trigger funds or rescue funds) cases in
lower courts prior to Arizona Free Enterprise Club, see Eric H. Wexler, A Trigger Too Far?: The
Future of Trigger Funding Provisions in Public Campaign Financing After Davis v. FEC, 13 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1141, 1143 (2011).
208 Ariz. Free Enter. Club, 131 S. Ct. at 2828.
209 Id. at 2836.
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separation between candidates and independent expenditure
groups negates the possibility that independent expenditures
will result in the sort of quid pro quo corruption with which
our case law is concerned. Including independent expenditures
in the matching funds provision cannot be supported by any
anticorruption interest.
The Court disregarded Caperton, which indicated that an appearance of
corruption resulted from independent expenditures in a judicial election. A
"multiplier effect" concerned the Court, whereby "[e]ach dollar spent by the
privately funded candidate results in an additional dollar of funding to each of
that candidate's publicly financed opponents." 2 1 1 This in turn puts privately
financed candidates at a disadvantage because "[e]ven if that candidate opted to
spend less than the initial public financing cap, any spending by independent
expenditure groups to promote the privately financed candidate's election-
regardless whether such support was welcome or helpful-could trigger
matching funds."212
The Court made clear that it is not declaring public financing all
together unconstitutional, stating that "[i]t is not the amount of funding that the
State provides to publicly financed candidates that is constitutionally
problematic in this case. It is the manner in which that funding is provided-in
direct response to the political speech of privately financed candidates and
independent expenditure groups."2 13 Thus, states implementing public
financing schemes will be required to set flat rates and will run the risk of
under-distributing or over-distributing funds to publicly funded candidates.
The Pilot Program is structured like the Arizona law and contains a
214
similar matching funds provision. In Arizona Free Enterprise Club, the laws
only applied to legislative and executive elections; thus, the Court could not
distinguish between the political branches and the judiciary. In fact, Arizona
Free Enterprise Club "did not deal specifically with judicial elections at all,
because the Arizona law at issue involved only legislative and executive races.
As a result, there are strong arguments that judicial public financing would
survive a litigation challenge like that in Arizona Free Enterprise Club."215
210 Id at 2826-27 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
211 Id. at 2810.
212 Id. at 2819.
213 Id. at 2824.
214 The Arizona law may be distinguished from the Pilot Program because the Arizona law
dispersed matching funds at the contribution stage and not at the expenditure stage.
215 ADAM SKAGGS & MARIA DA SILVA, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2009-2010,
22 (2011) available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/
the new-politics ofjudicialelections2009-10/. The project was a joint effort among the
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, the Justice at Stake
Campaign, and the National Institute on Money in State Politics.
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B. Does Arizona Free Enterprise Club Overrule North Carolina Right To
Life?
In 2008, prior to Arizona Free Enterprise Club, the Fourth Circuit
addressed the issue of a matching funds provision in a public financing scheme
for judicial elections in North Carolina Right to Life Committee Fund for
Independent Political Expenditures v. Leake.2 16 Citing Buckley, the court
rejected First Amendment challenges to the matching funds scheme because
candidates and independent spenders "remain free to raise and spend as much
money, and engage in as much political speech, as they desire." 217 The court
goes beyond just stating that the public financing scheme does not violate free
speech, rather it "furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amendment values by
ensuring that the participating candidate will have an opportunity to engage in
responsive speech."218
The Fourth Circuit further stressed that the "vital interest in an
independent judiciary" has been protected "at least [back] to our nation's
founding."219 However, the Supreme Court in Arizona Free Enterprise Club
ignored the issue of publicly financed matching funds in a judicial race and did
not mention or cite North Carolina Right To Life. The Supreme Court had the
opportunity to review North Carolina Right To Life but refused to do So.220
While Arizona Free Enterprise Club called in to doubt the constitutionality of
the North Carolina law, it does not explicitly make matching funds schemes in
a judicial race unconstitutional. The Seventh Circuit took briefs on the
Wisconsin matching fund provision for its judicial election public financing,
but the court never decided the issue because the legislature changed the law.22 1
Attorney General McGraw was wrong to simply say Arizona Free
Enterprise Club made the Pilot Program unconstitutional without
acknowledging North Carolina Right To Life.222 The constitutionality of
2 N. C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427,
432 (4th Cir. 2008). The late Judge M. Blane Michael, who wrote this opinion, was a native of
West Virginia and graduated from West Virginia University as an undergrad. Note that West
Virginia is also in the Fourth Circuit. For a discussion of publically financed judicial elections
focused around the experience in North Carolina, see Paul D. Carrington, Public Funding of
Judicial Campaigns: The North Carolina Experience and the Activism of the Supreme Court, 89
N.C. L. REv. 1965 (2011).
217 N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fundfor Indep. Political Expenditures, 524 F.3d at 437 (utilizing
the reasoning from Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976)).
218 Id
219 Id at 441.
220 Duke v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 994 (2008).
221 See, e.g., Brief for Brennan as Amici Curiae Brief of Common Cause Supporting
Defendants, Wis. Right to Life Pol. Action Comm. v. Brennan, No. 3:09 cv 00764 (No 11-1769)
(7th Cir. June 17, 2011), available at brennan.3cdn.net/e84c556dcf95e480d7 bnm6b9cwe.pdf.
222 Letter from W. Va. Att'y Gen. McGraw, supra note 193.
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matching funds provisions for judicial elections will likely be reviewed by
courts sometime during or after the 2012 election. In doing so a court should
look not only to Arizona Free Enterprise Club but also to North Carolina Right
To Life and the history of distinguishing the judiciary in selection methods and
the regulation of campaign speech. If a court applies a balancing test, it will
likely find that any speech it hinders is outweighed by the compelling state
interest of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof. However, if strict
scrutiny is extended to judicial elections, even then the Pilot Program should be
upheld because it is narrowly tailored to fix the appearance of impropriety on
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Part VI compares the Pilot
Program with other methods of judicial selection and weighs the pros and cons
of each method.
VI. SOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MODERN CAMPAIGN FINANCE
JURISPRUDENCE AND HISTORICAL NOTIONS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The Judicial Selection process is exactly like the two
restaurants in a small WV town. I once had business affairs in
a small West Virginia town and when I was a boy, I first went
into that town about lunch time and I asked a constable where
to eat. He said, "Oh son, there are two restaurants here, X and
Y and they're both about the same, you could eat at either one
of them. " And I said, "Well, which one do you think is better. "
And he said, "Oh, they're just exactly the same, I'd go to
whatever one is closer." And I said, "Well, if you were going
to eat at one, which one would you pick." He said, "It
wouldn't make a bit of diference to me, but, " he said, "I'll tell
you one thing boy - which ever one you pick, you'll wish to hell
you'd picked the other one. " And that's the system ofjudicial
selection.
-Former Justice Richard Neely223
Due to the historically greater state interest in an independent judiciary,
and the overwhelming evidence of the appearance of impropriety in judicial
decisions, when evaluating judicial campaign regulation, courts and policy
makers alike should weigh the interests of an independent judiciary with
concerns for the freedom of speech. Accordingly, a balancing approach should
be used.
States have wildly varying methods of judicial selection.224 Generally,
there are two methods for judicial selection: judicial elections and judicial
223 Lisa A. Stamm, 1995 Chief Justice Richard Neely "Uniquely Unconventional," W. VA.
LAW., Jan. 1995, at 16, 20.
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appointments. Within judicial elections, there are partisan elections (like in
West Virginia) and nonpartisan elections.2 25 Within judicial appointments,
there are legislative appointments and executive appointments. Many states
have attempted to combine appointments with elections under "merit
selection," in which an independent group selects a number of possible
nominees and the governor and/or the legislature picks one. After being
appointed under merit selection, the judge is then subject to a retention election
after a period of time in which the judge is subject to an up or down vote from
the public without any competitors.
Selection methods should be evaluated by weighing their effect on the
independence of the judiciary with their effect on free speech rights. Figure 6
shows a two-dimensional diagram that can be used to evaluate what selection
method should be chosen. The ideal policy should land in quadrant one, and no
policy landing in the fourth quadrant should be adopted.
Figure 7 illustrates the pros and cons of each of the judicial selection
methods in the speech-independent judiciary framework. There is no magic
cure to ensure that a state maximizes speech and upholds the independence and
integrity of the judiciary. The Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence
creates the problem of states having to choose between taking the voters out of
the equation or allowing judicial elections to be lawless, Wild West-like affairs.
Partisan elections without any additional regulation are a threat to judicial
independence even though freedom of speech is maintained. Nonpartisan
elections do little to solve the potential for corruption. In fact, political parties
may endorse and work to get judicial candidates elected in nonpartisan races.226
But the Roberts Court's campaign finance jurisprudence has set up a conflict
between the distinct interest in an independent judiciary and electoral politics
run rampant. The Court leaves no middle ground. Justice Stevens recognized a
"conflict between the demands of electoral politics and the distinct
characteristics of the judiciary."2 27 Dissenting in White, Justice Stevens said,
"we do not have to put States to an all or nothing choice of abandoning judicial
elections or having elections in which anything goes.... [W]e cannot know for
224 For an in depth summary of every state's judicial selection processes and make of the
judiciary, see AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, supra note 42. See also, Methods of Judicial Selection:
Removal of State Judges, AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y, available at
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicialselection/methods/removal-ofjudges.cfm?state (last
visited Sept. 16, 2012) (describing how judges may be removed from office in each state). See
infra Part II.B.
225 For an analysis of the pros and cons of judicial elections, see David E. Pozen, The Irony of
Judicial Elections, 108 COLuM. L. REv. 265 (2008).
226 See generally Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991).
227 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 799 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sure whether an elected judge's decisions are based on . .. political
expediency." 2 28
Because judicial elections have the potential to threaten the judiciary,
many states appoint judges, but this takes voters out of the equation, hampering
any voice they have independent of lobbying the governor or legislature.
Proponents of merit selection believe that appointments straight from the
governor or legislature are also too political and subject to inter-branch quid
pro quo corruption that may create a separation of powers problem. Under
merit selection, an independent committee, usually made up of attorneys, is
charged with choosing a list of people for the legislature and/or governor to
choose from. This only further separates the voters from the selection of judges,
but proponents of merit selection, like Justice O'Connor, believe it is best at
upholding the independence and integrity of the judiciary.22 9 Proponents of
merit selection are concerned about justices ruling on cases based on the
reelection implications of the decision. Merit selection is best criticized by
analogy:
Imagine that Congress enacted a law under which the nation's
bank presidents elect three people to serve as candidates for
Secretary of the Treasury, and the President is required to
appoint one of these candidates. Or suppose that a state
required its governor to choose the chief of the state police
230from a slate of three candidates elected by the state troopers.
One journalist facetiously quipped that "merit selection of legislators
might be a better idea than merit selection of judges-of course, there might be
some constitutional questions involved." 2 3 1 The point is that such a scheme is
undemocratic. It is for this reason that merit selection is usually combined with
retention elections so that voters have a say whether or not to renew a judges
term.
Some states have begun to move toward public financing of judicial
elections as a middle-of-the-road approach to limit the impact of electioneering
on the integrity of the judiciary while maintaining direct accountability to the
228 Id. at 800.
229 Id. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I am concerned that, even aside from what judicial
candidates may say while campaigning, the very practice of electing judges undermines this
interest.")
230 Nelson Lund, May Lawyers Be Given the Power to Elect Those Who Choose Our Judges?
"Merit Selection" and Constitutional Law, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1043, 1043 (2011).
231 Matthew Bieniek, The People Should Elect Judges, THE JoURNAL March 16, 2009,
http://www.joumal-news.net/page/content.detaillid/517082/The-people-should-elect-judges.htrnl.
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232
voters.22 The purpose of publicly financed judicial elections is to limit the
potential for quid pro quo corruption and the appearance of impropriety while
also maintaining electoral accountability. States may offer voluntary public
financing for all types of elections, but now under Arizona Free Enterprise
Club, states run the risk of over-spending or under-spending on public
financing without a matching funds provision (at least in legislative and judicial
elections). Even if Arizona Free Enterprise Club is applied to judicial elections
rendering matching funds unconstitutional, there may be a number of ways for
states to adequately price public financing without a matching funds provision.
First, a state may allow a publicly financed candidate to raise additional
money privately as opponents and independent groups outspend the publicly
financed candidate. Second, a state may offer metered voluntary pubic
financing. Under this type of scheme, publicly financed candidates would have
to get more signatures and small private donations once opposition spending
has passed a threshold in order to receive a second or third round of public
financing. Third, a state may try to condition funding based on something other
than opposition spending such as spending in non-judicial races or public
interest in the race. A state could conduct polls and if public interest in a
judicial election reaches a certain level (likely as a result of a great deal of
spending), then more public financing would be allotted. Fourth, a state may
publicly finance candidates through registered voters, whereby registered
voters are each given a set amount of public financing dollars that they may
anonymously (likely online through a blind trust administered by the secretary
of state) donate to candidates who qualify for public financing.2 33 All of these
represent ways around Arizona Free Enterprise Club but would be facially
constitutional because the increase in public financing is not a direct result of
opposition spending.
VII. CONCLUSION
Judicial elections are a horse of a different color. There is a long
history of distinguishing the judiciary from the other branches when it comes to
speech regulation and selection methods. Distinguishing the judiciary from the
political branches is so historically grounded that by writing this paper I have
essentially beaten a dead horse (of a different color). Nevertheless, modern
campaign finance law is at odds with the history of distinguishing the judiciary.
Modem campaign finance law from the Roberts Court threatens the sanctity of
judicial independence of state courts. Accordingly, First Amendment issues in
232 See Phyllis Williams Kotey, Public Financing for Non-Partisan Judicial Campaigns:
Protecting Judicial Independence While Ensuring Judicial Impartiality, 38 AKRON L. REv. 597
(2005) for an argument in support of publicly financed non-partisan judicial elections.
233 For more on how a system would work see BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYERS, VOTING WITH
DOLLARS: A NEw PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002).
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judicial elections should be viewed differently than First Amendment issues in
elections for political offices. Courts should take a balancing approach,
weighing the effect of a law on judicial independence with its effect on First
Amendment free speech rights.
In applying such a standard to the Pilot Program, the importance of
protecting the integrity and impartiality of the West Virginia judiciary is far
greater than any speech it may hinder. Secondarily, the Pilot Program
withstands strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to the compelling state
interest of reducing the unfortunate appearance of impropriety on the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
Anthony J. Delligatti*
* I hail from Fairmont, West Virginia, and am the Executive Development Editor of Vol.
115 of the West Virginia Law Review. I dedicate this Note to my late grandfather, Ross Maruka,
who was an attorney, law professor at West Virginia University, former editor of the West
Virginia Law Review, and most importantly a devout family man. Grandpa's own law review
student note was published in the West Virginia Law Review in 1958. Ross Maruka, Business
Records as Evidence in West Virginia, 60 W. VA. L. REV. 321 (1958). I also thank my family,
especially my brother Matt, Professors Atiba Ellis and Robert Bastress, my former boss Justice
Thomas E. McHugh (former West Virginia Law Review editor) who sparked my interest in the
topic, and my lovely girlfriend, Catie Wilkes. All of them have been very supportive of me and
made this Note possible.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1: Selection to State Courts ofLast Resort (1776-201 1)234
449
234 These data up to 2000 are available for download. Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga
Shvetsova, Replication Data for: Selecting Selection Systems, MURRAY RES. ARCHIVE ORGNIAL
COLLECTION DATAVERSE (Jan. 21 2009, 10:04 AM),
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mra/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?studyld=736&studyListingln
dex=O_01df50fe82e5125a48dd56d9df35. I have updated and the raw data and made some
interactive graphs and maps that can be seen at Anthony Delligatti, Judicial Selection to State
Courts of Last Resort (State Supreme Courts), A HORSE OF A DIFFERENT COLOR (July 14, 2012),
http://wvjustice.blogspot.com/2012/07/this-is-first-of-series-of-posts-that.html.
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Figure 2: Selection to State Courts ofLast Resort Separating Lifetime Appointments
(1776-2011)235
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Figure 3: State Supreme Court Candidate Funds Raised 2000-2009 Divided by
General Election Vote Totals236
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236 The data on expenditures were retrieved from SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 135.
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Figure 4: State Supreme Court Candidate Funds Raised 2000-2009 Divided by
General Election Vote Totals. Plus 2004 Expenditures by Don Blankenship Divided by
Brent Benjamin Vote Total 23 7
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Figure 5: Democratic Advantage: The Percentage ofDemocratic Votes Minus the
Percentage ofRepublican Votes238
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238 The data were compiled by West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Clerk Rory Perry
(former editor of the West Virginia Law Review) with the assistance of Brian O'Donnell from
Wheeling Jesuit University and then updated and analyzed by me. The Democratic Advantage
("DA") calculates only Republican and Democratic Votes. All of the years are weighted based
upon how many candidates from each party were running. For instance in 2008, one Republican
ran against two Democrats for two seats. The DA takes into account the number of candidates
running and not just the total number of votes cast.
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Figure 6: Theoretical Judicial Selection Diagram239
239 The author made the diagram.
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Figure 7: Judicial Selection Policies' EffectS240
Effect on
Policy eec Judicial Constitutional?
Independence
Partisan Yes
Elections (Base
Line)
Nonpartisan -Takes away -May slightly Yes, for judicial
Elections associational rights diminish appearance elections. Depends
of candidate to of impropriety and for political offices.
associate with a appearance of
party. judicial
- Parties may still independence.
endorse candidate.
-May cause less
money to be spent
on elections.
Appointment -Severely limits -Prevents "election Yes, for judicial
Merit Selection speech of voters and buying" and the elections. Depends
contributors by appearance of for political offices.
putting the decision corruption that
in the hands of the stems from the
executive and election process, but
legislative branches. may be no less
partisan or political.
-Quid pro quo
occurs between the
legislators or
governors and the
judge instead of
between donors!
independent
spenders and the
judge.
Retention Limits public speech Same as above, but Yes, forjudicial
Election on who should be in allows elections.
office until after a accountability to the Questionable, for
term voters at a later date. political elections.
Involuntary Limits the speech of Broadly takes away No
Public those wanting to most opportunitiesprivately finance to influence judicial
campaigns candidates through
private
contributions.
240 This table was made by the author.
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Effect on
Policy on Judicial Constitutional?
Independence
Banning Severely limits the Narrowly tailored to No
Independent speech rights of prevent theindependent groups Blankenship-
Expenditures and individuals, but Benjamin type of
allows candidates to appearance of
take ownership of corruption (Debt of
their message. gratitude) that
appears when an
outside entity
expends vast
resources.
Public May increase Allows judicial Yes
Financing speech, but may candidates to notdecrease the value or have to "dial for
effectiveness of any dollars" taking away
one expenditure of the appearance of
money. corruption.
Public Arguably increases Allows judicial Maybe forjudicial
Financing w/ speech, but may candidates to not elections. No, for
decrease the value of have to "dial for political elections.Matching any individual dollars" taking away
Funds expenditure. the appearance of
Matching funds may corruption.
deter spending
because it will be
offset by public
monies.candidatest
Recusal May deter those May prevent some Yes for judicial
Standards doping to influence impropriety (or offices. Irrelevantjudges from appearance thereof) for political offices.
spending or from judges sitting
donating money. on cases of
benefactors.political
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